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VABSTRACT
PEIRCE'S CRITIQUE OF INTROSPECTION
May, 1978
Gayle Lynn Stephens, B.A.
,
Harvard College
M.A. and Ph.D.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Bruce Aune
In one of his earliest philosophical essays, "Questions Concerning
Certain Faculties Claimed for Man", Charles Sanders Peirce advances the
thesis that "We have no power of Introspection". Although this thesis
plays a significant role in his philosophy of mind, it has thus far re-
ceived little serious attention. I expound this thesis and examine in
detail three arguments Peirce offers in its support. Each argument
draws upon Peircean views on other topics. For this reason, I devote
some effort to working out his account of our initial experience of our
own mental states, his theory of mental activity, and his distinction
between the psychical and the external. I conclude that, though he
fails to establish the strongest version of the claim that we have no
power of introspection, his critique of introspection is a qualified
success
.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1868 Peirce wrote two essays "in the spirit of opposition to
Cartesianism." These essays, "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties
Claimed for Man" and "Some Consequences of Four Incapacities," launch a
wide ranging attack on the Cartesian tradition in philosophy. Among the
positions that come under fire is the doctrine that we have introspec-
tive knowledge of mind. Peirce rejects this claim, maintaining the
thesis that "we have no power of introspection." This thesis reappears
throughout his works and forms an important theme in his philosophy of
mind. Despite its importance, Peirce's commentators have directed their
attention elsewhere and his critique of introspection has usually re-
ceived a very cursory treatment . 1 I believe that his views on intro-
spection merit serious examination and they can neither be under-
stood nor evaluated without a fairly extensive discussion. I propose,
therefore, to critically examine Peirce's contention that we have no
power of introspection and certain arguments he offers in support of that
view.
^The following works on Peirce’s philosophy have something to say
about his critique of introspection. (I shall list the author and the
work in chronological order, full citations are provided in the bibli-
ography.) Justus Buchler, Charles Peirce's Empiricism
, 1939; James K.
Feibleman, An Introduction to Peirce's Philosophy
, 19^6; George Gentry,
"Peirce's Early and Later Theory of Cognition and Meaning," 19^6;
Thomas Goudge
,
The Thought of C. S_. Peirce
, 1950; Manley Thompson, The
Pragmatic Philosophy of C. S_. Peirce
, 1953; Murray G. Murphey , The
Development of Peirce's Philosophy
,
196l; Larry Holmes, "Prolegomena
to Peirce's Philosophy of Mind," 196U; W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Prag-
matisrn, 1966 ; Israel Scheffler, Four Pragmatists , 197 7 • Only Gallie
makes a serious attempt to do more than summarize Peirce's discussion.
(See Chapter Three of his Peirce and Pragmatism .
)
Vlll
I should make clear from the beginning the limitations of the
project I shall undertake. A full treatment of Peirce's critique of
introspection would have to deal at length with his theory of signs, his
metaphysics, and his general theory of knowledge. In order to restrict
my discussion to manageable size, I shall focus on three arguments
Peirce offers in support of his views on introspection. I shall con-
sider his positions on other issues only in so far as they are relevant
to these arguments. The three arguments selected are not the only
arguments in his works concerning introspection; they are the arguments
I consider the most interesting and the most important. I hope to make
a good start on the interpretation and criticism of Peirce's critique of
introspection, but I shall leave much to be done.
Peirce's three arguments differ in what they try to show. In the
first, drawn from ’'Questions”, 5 .244- .249*
,
he regards as introspective
any knowledge of the internal world not derived from external obser-
vation. When he concludes in 5-249 that we have no power of introspec-
tion, he is maintaining that our whole knowledge of the internal world
derives by inference from external facts. The second argument involves
both a narrower conception of introspection and less extensive claims
concerning which sorts of knowledge are not introspective. In this
argument, which occurs in "Consequences”, Peirce contends that one
cannot ascertain by "direct perception" the nature of one's current
*A11 references to Peirce's writings are to the Collected Papers
of Charles Sanders Peirce published in eight volumes by the Harvard
University Press. The number preceding the decimal point refers to
the volume, those following to the paragraph. I shall dispense with
page references. See bibliography for full citation.
IX
mental state or activities. That is, one cannot distinguish joy from
anger or reasoning from reverie, for example, simply by inspecting the
sorts of mental states in question. He is not concerned here to estab-
lish that one's ability to tell whether one is angry depends upon one's
knowledge of external facts, or that all one's knowledge of the internal
world is inferential.
The third argument lies scattered throughout Peirce's later works.
As with the second, Peirce considers only a certain sort of psychological
knowledge. The term "introspection", as he uses it in his later works,
refers to knowledge of the internal as internal. He is concerned with
what I shall call the problem of location. This problem has two aspects:
(l) How does one recognize that mental phenomena are mental or, to use
Peirce's terminology, belong to the internal world? (2) How does one
recognize that a given mental phenomenon belongs to one's own internal
world? Peirce does not always keep these issues distinct, though his
third argument covers both. The third argument resembles the second in
its restricted scope, but it resembles the first in its ambition to show
that knowledge of the internal as internal derives from external facts
.
Its conclusion is that one's knowledge of the location of one's mental
phenomena depends upon knowledge of the external world.
In all three arguments Peirce maintains, at least, that some of our
knowledge of our own minds is inferential. The first argument goes
farther than the other two. If Peirce can show that all our knowledge
of the inner world derives by inference from external facts, the weaker
conclusions of the second and third arguments will be established by
Ximplication. For this reason, I shall begin by considering Peirce's
argument, in Questions". I believe that this argument fails. In
order to see whether he can salvage something of his critique of intro-
spection, I shall consider his later arguments. These arguments are
more successful and, I shall contend, provide good reason to reject
certain elements of the Cartesian position on introspective knowledge.
In this connection I offer a final introductory note. Although I
shall occasionally cite Descartes, I intend that my use of the term
"Cartesian" should correspond, in general, to Peirce's. I shall attempt
neither to develop the Cartesian position in its own right nor to show
that Peirce correctly interprets that position. At one point, however,
I feel that it is important to understand the nature of the Cartesian
view. I shall note that point when it arises.
CHAPTER I
A PRELIMINARY LOOK AT QUESTION FOUR
Peirce's earliest published discussion of introspection appears
under the fourth of the seven questions he raises in "Questions Concern-
ing Faculties Claimed for Man." He opens the discussion by asking
"Whether we have any power of introspection" and brings it to a con-
clusion with the assertion that "There is no reason for supposing a
power of introspection; and, consequently, the only way of investigating
a psychological question is by inference from external facts." In this
chapter I shall take a preliminary look at the argument contained in the
five paragraphs intervening between Question Four and this conclusion. I
shall consider that argument more closely in Chapter II.
It may seem excessive to devote two chapters to five paragraphs
.
More likely, my discussion is too brief. William James described Peirce's
essay as "extremely bold, subtle, and incomprehensible . "^ James'
assessment applies in full force to the argument of these five paragraphs.
These passages bristle with unacknowledged assumptions, unexplained
terms and unsupported assertions. Even in saying that I shall provide
a preliminary exposition of Peirce's argument, I overstate my intentions:
it is by no means clear what argument he makes in the paragraphs under
discussion. Nor does the discussion of Peirce's views on introspection
"'"Quoted in Ralph Barton Perry's The Thought and Character of
William James . Boston, 1936, p. 2.
1
2in the secondary literature fill in the gaps in the original. Among
Peirce’s commentators, only W. B. Gallie undertakes much more than a
summary of the text. I shall record my objections to Gallie' s inter-
pretation in the course of this chapter. The above considerations
justify the length, if not the content, of my exposition.
As I mentioned, the question whether we have a power of intro-
spection is the fourth Peirce considers in his essay. Since he pre-
supposes the answers to the three preceding questions in his discussion
of the fourth, a brief review of the earlier questions will be helpful.
Question One : Whether by the simple contemplation
of a cognition, independently of any previous knowledge
and without reasoning from signs, we are enabled rightly
to judge whether that cognition has been determined
by previous cognitions or whether it refers immediately
to its object.
In Question One Peirce asks whether we can know intuitively that a
given cognition is an intuition. An intuition, he says, is "a cognition
not determined by a previous cognition . .
.
,
and therefore so determined
by something out of the consciousness” (5-213). As the wording of
Question One suggests, he regards intuitive knowledge as arising simply
from contemplation or inspection of its object. He does not explain,
however, what it is for one cognition to "determine" another. He does
make clear that the notion takes in a fairly broad range of relations
among thoughts. For example, the premises of an argument "determine"
the conclusion and previous waking experience "determine" the content
3of dreams
. In the former case determination proceeds according to
logical principles
,
in the latter according to "laws of association,"
but he applies determination" in the same sense to both ( 5 . 217 ).
Finally, note that Question One concerns how we could know that we have
intuitions and not whether we have them. The latter issue Peirce takes
up in Question Seven.
Peirce answers Question One in the negative. "There is," he asserts
no evidence that we have this faculty except that we seem to feel that
we have it" (5.21U). But as he points out, to rely on such a feeling
presupposes that we have just the sort of intuitive power whose existence
is in question: that is, that we can tell intuitively whether a cog-
nition has been determined by other cognitions. To accept such evidence,
then, would be to prejudge the answer to Question One. Further, Peirce
offers several reasons for believing that we do not possess the intuitive
faculty under discussion. First, he supposes that, if we had such a
power, there should be considerable agreement about which sorts of
cognitions are intuitive. He contends that a survey of intellectual
history and contemporary opinion reveals no such consensus (5. 215).
Second, he argues that everyday experience with eye-witness testimony
shows that people have great difficulty "distinguishing what they have
seen from what they have inferred" ( 5 - 2l 6 ). Finally, he adduces a
number of instances in which, he maintains, knowledge once thought
intuitive has been shown to be determined by other cognitions. He
mentions, among other cases, judgments concerning an object's position
in three dimensional space and concerning the pitch of a tone (5-219-
It
•233). Considering all the evidence, Peirce concludes, one should
reject the claim that we can tell intuitively whether a given cognition
has been determined by some other.
Peirce uses the above conclusion to block appeals to intuition in
the discussion of later questions. In addition, his remarks in Question
One have a more general significance. He will later argue that our
knowledge of our own. existence, our ability to distinguish belief from
mere conception — indeed, all our knowledge of our own mental states —
depends upon inference. He recognizes that these contentions seem
contrary to our experience, for we do not feel that such knowledge
involves inference. He wants to establish, therefore, that we cannot
reasonably rely on such feelings in ascertaining whether a given bit of
knowledge is intuitive or inferential.
Question Two : Whether we have an intuitive self-conscious-
ness .
Peirce explains what he means by "self-consciousness" as follows:
Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be
distinguished from consciousness generally, from the
internal sense and from pure apperception. Any cognition is
a consciousness of the object as represented; by self-con-
sciousness is meant a knowledge of ourselves. Wot a mere
feeling of the subjective conditions of consciousness,
but of our personal selves. Pure apperception is the
self-assertion of THE EGO
; the self-consciousness here
meant is the recognition of my private self. I know that
I (not merely the l) exist. The question is, how do I
know it; by a special intuitive faculty, or is it determined
by previous cognitions? (5.225)
Question One establishes that we cannot know intuitively that we
have intuitive self-consciousness. "Therefore," Peirce says, "the
5existence or non-existence of this power is to he determined upon evi-
dence and the question is whether self-consciousness can be explained by
the action of known faculties under conditions known to exist "or
whether we must postulate an "intuitive faculty of self-consciousness"
(5*226). He argues that we can account for our knowledge of our private
selves without postulating with a faculty
. His account of how we might
get such knowledge by inference deserves a detailed treatment. I am
concerned, however, with his critique of introspection rather than his
positive views on first-person psychological knowledge. For that
reason, I shall simply refer the reader to Question Two 5. 229 -. 236 for
Peirce's account. Peirce's critical views on intuitive self-conscious-
ness are the topic of Chapter V.
Question Three : Whether we have an intuitive power of
distinguishing between the subjective elements of
different kinds of cognitions.
Peirce explains as follows
:
Every cognition involves something represented, or
that of which we are conscious, and some action or
passion of the self whereby it becomes represented.
The former may be termed the objective, the latter
the subjective element of the cognition. ... It
is possible that ... an intuition of the subjective
element of a cognition, of its character, whether
that of dreaming, imagining, conceiving, believing,
etc., should accompany every cognition. The question
is whether this is so. ( 5 . 238 )
The question, then, is whether one can know intuitively in what
sort of cognition one is engaged: whether one perceives or merely
6imagines something, whether one fully accepts or simply entertains a
proposition. Peirce denies that we need postulate any intuitive faculty
in order to explain our ability to distinguish these states. Perceiving
and imagining, he claims, may be distinguished by references to differences
in their "immediate objects" (5-24l). Just what he means by this I am
not prepared to say. Believing and conceiving may be distinguished in
two ways: (l) A "peculiar feeling of cognition" accompanies belief
and, therefore, one can identify belief by noting the presence of this
feeling; (2) A belief is "that judgment from which a man will act" and,
hence
,
one may ascertain whether one believes or merely conceives that
something is the case by seeing whether one will act on the thought in
question should the opportunity arise (5-242). Thus, Peirce maintains,
we can explain our ability to distinguish among these sorts of cognitions
without having recourse to talk about an intuitive power of recognizing
such distinctions.
The foregoing remarks set the scene for the examination of Question
Four. I shall not explain in detail or defend Peirce's treatment of the
earlier questions. Certain issues raised in those questions will reappear
in later discussion, however, and I shall deal with them as they arise.
Question Four : Whether we have any power of introspection
or whether our whole knowledge of the internal world is
derived from observation of external facts.
Peirce opens his comments on Question Four with a disclaimer.
It is not intended here to assume the reality of
the external world. Only, there is a certain
set of facts which are ordinarily regarded as
external, while others are regarded as internal.
The question is whether the latter are known
otherwise than by inference from the former. (5-244)
7The above comments introduce a cluster of problems that go un-
resolved m "Questions." It will appear, as Peirce develops his argu-
ment in Question Four, that the "external facts" from which knowledge of
the internal world is supposed to derive are neither external nor factual.
Problems concerning their status as facts are best discussed elsewhere
(See Chapter II). The problem of their externality comes to the fore in
the passage quoted. Peirce makes clear that the facts he has in mind
are not necessarily facts about an external world. He does not explain,
however, what makes these facts external facts: unless the explanation
is that they are external simply because they are ordinarily so regarded.
This explanation merely invites the further question, ' What is it for a
fact to be regarded as external? 5 In order to explain Peirce's notion of
externality and to answer the numerous questions about external facts
left unresolved in Question Four, one must look to his later works. I
shall consider his account of externality in Chapter V. For the present,
problems about external fact will be left hanging.
Following his opening disclaimer, Peirce explains what he means by
introspection
:
By introspection I mean a direct perception of
the internal world, but not necessarily a perception
of it as_ internal. Nor do I mean to limit the
signification of the word to intuition, but would
extend it to any knowledge of the internal world
not derived from external observation. (5.2UU)
This passage offers two different characterizations of
introspection. According to the first, introspection involves a direct
perception, or knowledge by direct perception, of things internal. In
8the second, introspection includes any knowledge of the internal world
not derived from external observation. Thus, for example, knowledge of
the internal world derived by inference from internal facts comes under
the second characterization of introspection, but not the first. Peirce
addresses his argument in Question Four to the second, broader conception
of introspection.
One should note that Peirce does not restrict introspection to
knowledge of the mental as mental. Question Pour concerns "our whole
knowledge of the internal world" and one may have knowledge of a mental
phenomenon without recognizing that it is mental. He makes this fairly
explicit in 5.2UU: "By introspection I mean a direct perception of the
internal world, hut not necessarily a perception of it as internal." I
draw attention to this point for two reasons. First, in his later works
Peirce does restrict introspection to knowledge of the internal as
internal (See Chapter V ) „ Second, two of his commentators, Justus
Buchler and Thomas Goudge
,
treat the argument in Question Four as though
it deals only with knowledge of the internal as internal. Buchler, for
example, interprets Peirce's claim that we have no power of introspec-
tion as follows: "Thus, neither the self nor its cognitions considered
as mental activities or processes is known intuitively." 2 This may be
an accurate reading of Peirce's later conclusions about introspection,
but it misconstrues his intentions in Question Four.
p
Justus Buchler, Charles Peirce's Empiricism . New York, 1939,
p. 13. See also, Thomas Goudge, The Thought of C . S . Peirce
,
Toronto,
1950, p. 232.
9Peirce argues that we have no power of introspection
,
that our
whole knowledge of the internal world derives from external observation.
To make his case, he considers three sorts of knowledge of the inner world
and attempts to show that each derives from external facts. He first
discusses knowledge of sensations.
There is one sense in which any perception has an
internal object, namely, that every sensation is
partly determined by internal conditions. Thus,
the sensation of redness is as it is
,
owing to the
constitution of the mind; and in this sense it is
a sensation of something internal. Hence, we may
derive knowledge of the mind from a consideration
of this sensation, but that knowledge would, in
fact, be an inference from redness as a predicate
of something external. (5-2^5)
This passage is too brief and too vague to be very helpful. Peirce
does not tell us what knowledge of mind the subject derives from con-
sidering a sensation of redness; knowledge of the quality redness; the
knowledge that he is having a sensation, or the knowledge that his
sensation is, in a sense, "a sensation of something internal." Nor is
it clear from what external facts the subject derives knowledge of mind.
Is it the fact that some external thing presents itself to him? W. B.
Gallie suggests that Peirce's argument has something to do with the
claim that the predicate "red" applies primarily to external objects and
3
only derivatively to sensations. Whether or not Gallie is correct, it
requires considerable interpretation to extract the doctine he suggests
from 5 . 2 ^ 5 . Finally, Peirce does not say how the subject derives
knowledge of mind from a consideration of the sensation in question.
3
W. B. Gallie, Peirce and Pragmatism . New York, 1966 , p. 68.
10
Perhaps such knowledge arises from the discovery that "the sensation of
redness is as it is owing to the constitution of the mind." In any
case, Peirce has a lot of explaining to do.
The next example receives a fuller discussion.
There are certain other feelings — the emotions,
for example — which appear to arise in the first
place, not as predicates at all, and to be referable
to the mind alone. It would seem, then, that by
means of these, a knowledge of the mind may be
obtained, which is not inferred from any character
of outward things
. The question is whether this is
really so. (5.2U5) 4
5 . 2 U 7 . In reference to the above argument
. .
.,
it must be admitted that if a man is angry, his
anger implies in general, no determinant and
constant character in its object. But, on the
other hand, it can hardly be questioned that there
is some relative character in the outward thing
which makes him angry and a little reflection will
serve to show that his anger consists in his saying
to himself
,
"this thing is vile, abominable, etc."
and that it is rather a mark of returning to reason
to say, "I am angry." In the same way any emotion
is a predication concerning some object, and the chief
difference between this and an objective intellectual
judgment is that while the latter is relative to human
nature or to mind in general, the former is relative
to the particular circumstances and dispositions of
a particular man at a particular time.
The passages quoted above seem to reveal the outline of an argu-
ment. Peirce begins with an account of the nature of the emotions.
Whenever the subject is angry, for example, "there is some relative
*5-2^6 contains an argument to the effect that we cannot know
intuitively that we possess a power of introspection. This conclusion,
Peirce maintains, follows from his argument under Question Three that
"we have no intuitive faculty of distinguishing different subjective
modes of consciousness."
11
character in the outward thing that makes him angry" and his anger
consists in his judging that some external thing has a certain quality.
This description of anger seems to he a particular application of a 'more
general view. In Question Two, for example, Peirce remarks:
Wo one questions that
,
when a sound is first
heard hy a child, he thinks, not of himself as
hearing, hut of the hell or other object as
sounding. How when he wills to move the table?
Does he think of himself as desiring, or only of
the table as fit to he moved? That he has the
latter thought is beyond question.
. .
. (5.230)
Apparently Peirce holds that our unreflective experience of our own
mental states is an experience of what are, or what we take to he,
qualities of outward objects.
Further, it seems that the external facts from which the subject
derives knowledge of his emotions are facts stated by such judgments as
’This thing is vile': that is, the unreflective judgments concerning
external objects which the subject makes whenever he is in an emotional
state express the external facts from which he infers that he is in the
state in question. Peirce does not explain how one gets from the judg-
ment that something is vile to the conclusion that one is angry. Perhaps,
this inference involves the discovery that one’s judgment that something
is vile, unlike one’s "objective intellectual judgments," somehow depends
upon one's particular dispositions and circumstances. However he accounts
for the derivation, Peirce does suggest that the path to knowledge of
one's own emotional states originates in judgments concerning "relative"
characteristics of external objects. Looking back to 5 -2^5, this seems
to be what he is saying about sensations as well.
12
Although I shall not attempt to work out the argument sketched
above until Chapter II, it is instructive to compare the passages just
discussed with W. B. Gallie's account of Peirce’s argument in Question
Four. According to Gallie, Peirce maintains that all our knowledge of
our own minds "is derived from our knowledge of certain ’outward'
physical facts: namely
. .
.
parts or results of our own
. . . behavior." 5
Clearly, neither Peirce’s discussion of sensation nor his remarks on the
emotions make any reference to behavior. This is not to say that he
never suggests that one may infer knowledge of one’s inner world from
facts about one’s behavior. The discussion of belief in Question Three,
5.242, might bear such interpretation. External facts concerning one's
behavior have no special place in the argument of Question Four, however.
Following his account of the emotions, Peirce adds a brief and very
obscure section on volition.
5.248. It remains then to inquire whether it is
necessary to suppose a particular power of intro-
spection for the sense of willing. Now, volition,
as distinguished from desire, is nothing but a power
of concentrating the attention, of abstracting. Hence,
the knowledge of the power of abstracting may be
inferred from abstract objects, just as knowledge
6f the power of seeing is inferred from colored
obj ects
.
The treatment of volition in 5.248 does not fit neatly with what
has gone before. What are the external facts in this case? That some
abstract object exists seems a doubtful candidate for the designation
"external fact." Furthermore, it is by no means clear what an abstract
object is supposed to be, nor how one recognizes the difference between
5
Ibid.
,
p. 80.
13
abstract and non-abstract objects. Nor is the analogy with color-
perception informative. Is the power of abstracting a power of per-
ceiving features of external objects or a power of creating abstract
objects? Finally, the identification of volition and the power of
concentrating the attention or of abstracting seems flatly mistaken.
Peirce's remarks on the power of abstracting in "Some Consequences
of Four Incapacities" may help to untangle the passage in Question Four.
There he says that, when one exercises the power of abstraction, "an
emphasis is put upon one of the objective elements of a cognition"
(5-295)- When one abstracts from a perception, for example, one puts an
emphasis on a certain feature of what one perceives, its color or its
shape, perhaps. One might suppose that such emphasis has the effect of
making the feature attended to seem particularly prominent relative to
the other characteristics of the object perceived. If so, one might
infer that one is exercising the power of abstraction from the fact that
the color, say, of a given object is unusually prominent. I shall not
attempt to defend this account of abstraction, but it does indicate how
Peirce might have been led to suppose that there is some external fact
,
i.e., that fact that some feature of an object is unusually prominent
relative to its other features, associated with the power of abstrac-
tion. Clearly it fails to explain why he identifies volition with the
power of abstraction and it offers no way of supplying external facts
corresponding to those instances of volition which concern things not
present, e.g., willing that one perform some future act.
14
It appears that one must turn to the discussion of emotion in
5.247 in order to discover the nature of Peirce's argument that our whole
knowledge of the internal world derives from external observation. I
shall examine that discussion minutely in Chapter II. The foregoing
account, however, indicates what Peirce must do to make good on the
suggestions in 5.247. He must explain the doctrine concerning our
experience of our mental states presupposed in that passage and he must
trace a route from that doctrine to his conclusions about our knowledge
of the internal world.
CHAPTER II
THE ARGUMENT OF QUESTION FOUR
To do justice to the argument in Question Four one must consider
Peirce s later writings as veil as his remarks in "Questions." I shall
begin by examining his comments on knowledge of the emotions in "Questions"
5.2^7. In 5.247 he prepounds the thesis that "any emotion is a predica-
tion concerning some object." He does not explain this doctrine in
"Questions , " but he presents it at greater length in certain later
writings. I shall work out the details of his view by reference to his
later discussion, and then ask whether the doctrine that every emotion
involves a predication concerning some object is plausible in its own
right and whether this thesis has the epistemological consequences
Peirce ascribes to it. The latter question turns on what he means when
he claims that our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived
from the observation of external facts." I shall argue that this claim
is incompatible with the G’artesian tradition only if it concerns the
justification of beliefs about the internal world. If it is so inter-
preted, Peirce's discussion of the emotions provides no reason to suppose
that one's knowledge of one's own emotional states derives from external
facts. This result shows that his argument in Question Four fails to
establish that we have no power of introspection.
15
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Another look at Question Four
If there is an argument in "Questions" for the conclusion that our
knowledge of the internal world derives from external observation, it
must be extracted from the three examples Peirce discusses in 5 . 2U 5 ,
5. 2^ 7 and 5.248. In view of the brevity of the first and the obscurity
of the third example, his comments on the emotions in 5.247 must bear
the weight of the argument. I quote again the crucial section of that
passage
.
• I1: must be admitted that if a man is angry,
his anger implies, in general, no determinant and
constant character in its object. But, on the other
hand, it can hardly be questioned that there is some
relative character in the outward thing which makes
him angry
,
and a little reflection will serve to
show that his anger consists in his saying to himself,
"this thing is vile, abominable, etc." and that it is'
rather a mark of returning to reason to say, "I am
^-ng^y* In the same way any emotion is a predication
concerning some object, and the chief difference between
this and an objective intellectual judgment is that
while the latter is relative to human nature or to mind
in general, the former is relative to the particular
circumstances and disposition of a particular man at a
particular time. V/hat is here said of emotions in
general, is true in particular of the sense of beauty
&nd of the moral sense. Good and bad are feelings which
first arise as predicates, and therefore are either
predicates of the not—I
,
or are determined by previous
cognitions (there being no intuitive power of distinguish-
ing subjective elements of consciousness).
According to the above account, whenever the subject is angry,
there is some relative character of an outward thing which makes him
angry. Further, the subject's anger consists in his judging that
something, perhaps the outward thing whose character makes him angry,
is vile, for example. Finally, Peirce suggests that one only recog-
nizes that one is angry upon reflection.
IT
The foregoing remarks should point toward some argument
for the conclusion that the subject's knowledge that he is angry derives
by inference from external facts. In order to determine what argument
Peirce intends here, one must first decide from which external facts he
seeks to derive knowledge of the emotions. The passage quoted offers
two candidates: the fact that some relative character of an outward
thing causes the subject to become angry and the fact that something is
vile. The former will not serve for Peirce's argument since, if the
subject knows that some outward thing is making him angry, he knows
all eady that he is angry and it is this knowledge whose derivation
Peirce wants to explain. Perhaps some general truth about the causal
powers of external things provides the relevant external fact. For
example, the relevant external fact might be that objects having a
certain sort of relative character usually cause people to get angry.
One need not know that one is now angry in order to know this general
truth. However, this line of attack appears unpromising for two reasons:
(1) The most obvious explanation of how the general truth in question
could come to be known involves the supposition that people can recognize
that they are angry without knowledge of this general truth, i.e., they
note that they become angry on certain occasions and test various hypothese
concerning the causes of their anger. Here the discovery of anger pre-
dates discovery of its causal explanation. It may be that this 'obvious'
explanation is wrong, but, if so, Peirce would need to expose its errors.
(2) It seems clear that people occasionally become angry under conditions
which do not usually produce anger. In such cases, the object respon-
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sible for one’s anger would not be an object of a sort which usually
causes anger. Thus, no external fact of the appropriate sort would be
available in these instances
.
A further problem with the above approach is that it takes no
account of the judgmental element of emotions. Peirce seems to think it
important that "any emotion is a predication concerning some object."
Emphasizing this portion of his account, one might suppose that the
external facts from which knowledge of anger is derived are facts
expressed by such judgments as "This thing is vile." One might object
here that something’s being vile is a strange sort of thing to regard as
an external fact. Indeed, one should note that the claim that anger
consists in saying to oneself "This thing is vile," etc., has in itself
no connection with the view that anger is always caused by some charac-
ter of an outward object. The judgmental account of emotion could be
true even if there were no external objects. In view of Peirce's
reluctance to commit himself to the reality of an external world,
however, the foregoing remarks do not establish that he would deny that
"This thing is vile" states what is "ordinarily regarded" as an external
fact (see 5.2hk). His comparison between emotional predications and
"objective intellectual judgments" may be intended to show that the
former have as much right to be regarded as statements about externals
as the latter. Emotional predicates differ from, objective judgments,
not in being relative to mind, but in being relative to particular minds
rather than to "mind in general" (5.2kj).
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That Peirce mentions no other sorts of judgments than those rep-
resented by 'This thing is vile' further supports the contention that it
is such judgments which state the relevant external facts. To derive
knowledge of the internal world is, presumably, to infer statements
about that world from other statements. Statements, not facts, figure
in inferences. The only statements about externals mentioned in 5. 2*47
are those attributing some relative character, e,g., vileness (and,
later in the passage, goodness and beauty) to external objects.
Although I believe that the above suggestion accurately represents
Peirce s intentions regarding the external facts mentioned in Question
Four, I agree that something's being vile is a strange sort of external
fact. To go more deeply into this problem requires an examination of
his general views on internality and externality
. Such an examination
must wait until Chapter V.
Supposing that 'This thing is vile' expresses an external fact, why
does Peirce believe that one infers that one is angry from such state-
ments of external fact? As I noted in Chapter I, his contention seems
to depend, at least in part, on some theory concerning our experience of
our own emotional states. To see just what theory he has in mind requires
considerable effort.
In Question Four Peirce says that the subject's anger "consists in
his saying to himself 'This thing is vile, abominable,' etc." Further
he maintains that "in the same way any emotion is a predication concerning
some object" (5.2^7). These statements represent applications of a
general thesis which crops up elsewhere in "Questions." Under Question
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Two
, 5-2^0, he writes:
No. one questions that, when a sound is heard by a
child, he thinks, not of himself as hearing, but of
the bell or other object as sounding. How when he
wills. to move the table? Does he think of himself as
desiring, or only of the table as fit to be moved?
That he has the latter thought is beyond question.
.
The view indicated above, which I shall call The Externalization
Thesis (ET), receives its most detailed expression in Peirce's post-1900
works
.
In a certain sense, there is such 3, thing as intro-
spection; but it consists in an interpretation of
phenomena presenting themselves as external percepts.
We first see red and blue things
. It is quite a
discovery when we find the eye has anything to do
with them, and a discovery still more recondite when
we learn that there is an ego behind the eye
,
to
which these qualities properly belong. ( 8 . 1 U U ,
"Pearson’s Grammar of Science a review published in
1901.)
. . . Everything in the psychical sciences is infer-
ential. Not the smallest fact about the mind can be
directly perceived as psychical. An emotion is directly
felt as a bodily state, or else it is known only
inferentially
. That a thing is agreeable appears to
direct observation as a character of an object, and
it is only by inference that it is referred to the
mind. (1.250, Minute Logic
,
circa 1902, unpublished.)
I think it is probably true that every element of
experience is in the first instance attributed to an
external object. A man who gets up out of the wrong
side of the bed, for example, attributed wrongness to
almost every object he perceives. That is the way in
which he experiences his bad temper. (1.335, "Phaner-
oscopy or the Natural History of Concepts," circa
1905 .)
It is, however, a patent fact that we never, in the
first instance, attribute a quality of feeling to
ourselves. We first attribute it to a Non-ego and
only come to attribute it to ourselves when irre-
fragable reasons compel us to do so. (5-57, Lectures
on Pragmatism
,
1903-
)
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Ignoring certain questions for the moment, the view expressed above
would seem to amount to the following:
(1) When, in the first instance, the subject experiences some
*1
quality of feeling, he attributes it to an external object,
i.e., judges that it is a quality of an external object.
(2) The subject’s experience of his own internal states and activ-
ities is /in the first instance?7 an experience of qualities
of feeling.
(3) Thus, when the subject experiences his own internal states he
experiences certain qualities of feeling which, in the first
instance, he tahes to be qualities of external objects.
(3) will serve as a statement of the Externalization Thesis.
It is worth noticing one difference between ET as expressed in the
post-1900 passages and the view Peirce seems to adopt in Question Four.
Introducing a bit of philosophical jargon, one might say that the thesis
summarized in (3) above may be read de dicto or de_ re . On the de dicto
reading, (3) asserts merely that the subject judges or believes that
some external object has a certain quality. Given a de re_ interpretation,
(3) would imply that there exists some external object to which the
subject attributes the quality in question. Thus, one who adopts ET in
"Quality of feeling" is a bit of standard Peircean terminology.
It covers any quality presented to the subject in that mode of
consciousness Peirce calls "Feeling". Included here are sensory
qualities and, apparently, moral and aesthetic qualities such
as goodness, wrongness, and beauty (See 5-2^7 and 1.335).
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its de re interpretation commits himself to the claim that, in order for
the subject to experience his own emotional state, some external object
must exist: on its de di et o reading the thesis involves no such commit-
ment; it asserts only that the subject has a certain belief. Nothing in
the post-1900 statements of ET forces Peirce to adopt the de re inter-
pretation. His remarks in 5-2^7, however, strongly suggest that, whenever
the subject is angry, there is some outward thing which the subject
takes to be vile. This suggestion arises from the juxtaposition of the
claim that if a man is angry . . . there is some relative character in
the outward thing which makes him angry," and the contention that, "a
little reflection will serve to show that his anger consists in his
saying to himself, ‘This thing is vile'." A natural reading of the
above would be that the subject judges of the outward thing which makes
him angry that it has the relative character vileness
,
in which case
the subject cannot be angry unless there is an outward thing that
he regards as vile. Perhaps, then, there are textual grounds for pre-
ferring a de_ re_ formulation of ET . But, as we shall see, such a reading
renders that thesis highly improbable.
Another question of interpretation concerns the qualifying phrase
"in the first instance" included in the statement of ET. When Peirce
says, in 5 • 57 9 that "we never, in the first instance, attribute a quality
of feeling to ourselves," his comment may be taken in two ways: (a)
whenever the subject encounters an instance of some quality of feeling,
he attributes that instance of the quality to some external thing and he
can attribute the quality-instance in question to himself only when
"irrefragable reasons" compel him to do so, or (b) at some early stage
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m the subject's intellectual development, he attributes all instances
of qualities of feeling to external things. The second alternative
leaves open the possibility that the subject may later acquire a degree
of sophistication which allows him to attribute qualities of feeling to
himself without first ascribing them to externals. As before, the
decision between these alternative interpretations affects the plausi-
bility of ET, but I find nothing in the statements of that thesis which
forces one or the other reading.
Putting interpretive questions aside for the moment, let us ask
what reasons Peirce advances in support of ET . That thesis involves two
controversial claims: the claim that, in the first instance, the subject
attributes qualities of feeling to external objects, and the view that
the subject's experience of his own mental states is merely an experience
of certain qualities of feeling. In order to evaluate this latter
contention one must consider Peirce's argument that we do not directly
perceive our own mental operations. Since that argument will be dis-
cussed in Chapter IV, let us concede his point for the present and focus
on the argument for the first claim.
Peirce seems to include, or at least to indicate, an argument for
the initial attribution of qualities of feeling to externals in 5 - 2UT
.
"Good and bad are feelings which first arise as predicates, and therefore
are either predicates of the not-I, or are determined by previous cognitions
(there being no intuitive power of distinguishing subjective elements of
consciousness)." The parenthetical remark may refer back to the argument
in Question Three where he asserts that we have no "intuitive power of
2h
distinguishing between the subjective elements of different kinds of
cognitions (5 -237) • It is difficult to see, however, what Question
Three has to do with the point at issue. It concerns this subject's
ability to discriminate among different kinds of internal states, not
his ability to tell whether a quality belongs to the I or the not-I.
More probably the enclosed comment refers the reader to Quation Two,
"whether we have an intuitive self-consciousness." There Peirce maintains,
for example, that when a child hears a sound, the child thinks of some
object as sounding rather than of itself as hearing (5.230). Interpreted
in the way just suggested, the comment within the parentheses asserts
that the subject has no intuitive power of distinguishing the subjective,
those things belonging to his inner world, from the objective, those
belonging to the outer one.
Certain remarks in "issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) lend credence to
the interpretation suggested above.
Introspection is wholly a matter of inference.
One is immediately conscious of Feelings
,
no
doubt ; but not that that they are feelings of
an ego . The self is only inferred. There is
no time in the present for any inference. . . .
Consequently the present object must be an external
object, if there be any objective reference it
it. ( 5 .U62 )
It seems reasonable to suppose that Peirce has comething like the above
argument in mind in Question Four as well.
What of this argument then? First, it presupposes that "feelings"
(by which, I take it, Peirce means "qualities of feeling") must be
attributed either to the ego or to the non-ego. Peirce then asks
whether, at the moment when it first appears in conscious, the subject
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can attribute a quality of feeling to the ego. He rules out this
suggestion on the grounds that the self, or ego, must be inferred and
that there is no time in the present to carry out such an inference.
Therefore, he concludes, when a quality of feeling first enters the
subject's consciousness, the subject must ascribe it to the external
world, the non-ego.
The argument developed above has two important shortcomings. First,
it is not clear what Peirce means when he says, "The self is only
inferred. If he means that the subject can obtain knowledge of the
self only by inference, his point is not relevant to the argument in
question. ihe subject need not have knowledge of the ego in order to
attribute a quality of feeling to himself, he need only believe in the
ego. The issue is not whether the subject knows that a quality of
feeling belongs to his inner world, but whether he takes it to belong
to that world. Thus, Peirce must hold that belief in the self arises by
inference, if his argument is to go through.
Actually, the argument may require an even stronger assertion. It
seems to suppose that, each time a quality of feeling presents itself to
the subject, he must run through an inference resulting in belief in the
self, if he is to attribute this quality to himself. This claim is
counter-intuitive. Presumably, once the subject arrives at belief in
the self, he can later employ this belief without having to re-establish
it on every occasion of its use. Even if he originally comes to have
this belief by inference, there is no reason to suppose that he must
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report that inference whenever he assigns a quality of feeling to his
inner world.
Peirce might get around the problem raised above by restricting
the claim that qualities of feeling are initially referred to the non-
ego. He could argue, as he does in Question Two, 5- 227-
.23^
,
that we
acquire a belief in the self long after our first experiences of quali-
ties of feeling and that, until we acquire this belief, we attribute all
such qualities to the external world. Further, he might add, we come to
have the concept of a self only by a process of inference. The argument
in 5 .H62 would explain, then, why we do not ascribe qualities of feeling
to the self from the moment of our intellectual awakening. To adopt
this strategy requires a corresponding restriction on the Externalization
Thesis itself: a restriction such as the one discussed earlier in my
remarks concerning the interpretation of the phrase "in the first instance"
in the statement of ET . Further, Peirce must show that we acquire a
belief in external things, the non-ego, before we acquire a belief in
the ego. But, this latter demonstration is required for the success of
the original argument in 5.462 as well. Perhaps, then, he can avoid the
first objection to that argument at no additional cost.
The second shortcoming of the argument in 5-462 appears when one
considers whether belief in the non-ego is temporally prior to belief in
the ego in human intellectual development. Peirce supposes that
qualities of feeling must be attributed either to the ego or to the
non-ego. He does not say why this is so. It seems possible that the
subject should initially attribute qualities of feeling to neither. One
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must not confuse the claim that any quality is a quality either of
the ego or of the non-ego, i.e., of something not identical with the
ego, with the assertion that the subject must ascribe any given quality
to one or the other. The categories 'ego' and 'non-ego' are exhaustive
inasmuch as any quality belonging to a thing must belong to a thing in
one of the two categories. But, in assigning location to qualities of
feeling, the subject need not employ these categories. He need not
believe either that a given quality belongs to the ego or that it is a
feature of the non-ego. Thus, Peirce is not entitled to move from the
premise that the subject cannot initially attribute a present quality
O-f* feeling to the ego, to the conclusion that the subject must then
attribute that quality to the non-ego. For this reason, if for no other
the argument in 5 .U62 lends no credibility to the Externalization Thesis
The failure of the argument discussed above is not disastrous for
ET. That thesis is probably best regarded as an empirical claim to be
tested by methods appropriate to developmental psychology rather than as
a conclusion necessitated by general philosophical considerations. In
any case, I shall now turn from considering why Peirce accepts ET to
examine its role in the argument of Question Four.
The critique of introspection and the Externalization Thesis
The argument of Question Four seems to rely on the Externalization
Thesis. To show that a man's knowledge that he is angry derives from
observation of external facts, Peirce apparently thinks it sufficient to
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point out that "there is some relative character in the outward thing
which makes him angry, and a little reflection will serve to show that
his anger consists in his saying to himself, 'This thing is vile,
abominable, etc.,'. . ." (5.1*2?)
. One must inquire, then, whether ET
has the epistemological consequences Peirce attributes it.
A general picture of our attainment of inner knowledge emerges from
the discussion of ET. We start with judgments ascribing qualities to
external objects. (I shall hereafter refer to such judgments as "external
statements.") These external judgments, ’This thing is vile,' for
example, express our original experience of our own internal states.
Somehow we get from this externalized experience to the knowledge that
there is an internal world and to the knowledge that specific qualities
and activities belong to it. Peirce summarizes the above account in his
review of Karl Pearson's Grammar of Science
, 1901.
. o . We have to set out upon our intellectual
travels from the home where we already find
ourselves. ... It is the external world that
we directly observe. What passes within we know
only as it is mirrored in external objects. In
a certain sense, there is such a thing as intro-
spection, but it consists in the interpretation
of phenomena presenting themselves as external
percepts, we first see red and blue things. It
is quite a discovery when we find the eye has
anything to do with them, and a discovery still
recondite when we learn that there is an ego
behind the eye, to which these qualities properly
belong. (6.1UU)
Just how, according to Peirce, we get from external ’percepts’
to knowledge of what lies 'behind the eye’ is a question I shall later
explore. But, if one grants him the Externalization Thesis, it seems
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tempting to suppose that such knowledge originates in, or derives from,
external judgments.
To see whether this supposition is reasonable, one must carefully
examine Peirce's claim that inner knowledge derives from external state-
ments. I suggested earlier that this claim involves, at a minimum, the
contention that the subject infers internal statements *2 from external
ones. This account leaves an important question unanswered, however:
Do such inferences merely explain how the subject comes to have certain
beliefs about his internal world, or do they justify those beliefs?
It is worth spending some time to get clear about the alternatives
mentioned. In The_ Nature of Things
,
Anthony Quinton draws a convenient
distinction between coming to believe by inference and coming to know
by inference. He points out that in some cases one first comes to a
particular belief as a result of having inferred it from some premises.
For example, I may come to believe that Jones is a thief after discover-
ing stolen property in his possession and inferring that he acquired
this property by theft. My inference leads to my belief, but it may or
may not justify it: my reasoning may be invalid, I may not be warranted
in accepting its premises. On the other hand, an inference may justify
*2
By "internal statements" I mean either statements explicitly
asserting that something is mental, belongs to the internal world, or
statements in which the speaker ascribes a particular internal state
to himself, e.g., 'I am angry.' Statements of the latter sort do not
presuppose that the speaker takes the state in question to be an
internal state.
^Anthony Quinton, The Nature of Things . London, 1973, p. 189.
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one of my beliefs even though I did not come to have the belief in
question as a result of carrying out that inference. Thus, I may form
the opinion that Jones is a thief out of some prejudice against him and
acquire justification for the opinion only after having run through an
appropriate bit of reasoning. Supposing that Jones is guilty, my
reasoning results in my coming to know that he is a thief, but it does
not account for my coming to believe that he is.
Since Peirce says that we derive knowledge of the internal world by
inferences from external facts, he presumably holds that such inferences
justify our beliefs about internals, rather than merely explain why we
have those beliefs. Furthermore, if Peirce aims to refute Cartesianism
,
the argument of Question Four should concern coming to know
justification — and not merely coming to believe. Descartes offers no
special account of how we come by our beliefs about the internal world.
Indeed, in the Second Meditation, he suggests that they are acquired
haphazardly and get rather mixed up with beliefs about the external
. k
world. What he proposes to explain is how such beliefs are justified .
Quite appropriately, he would not be moved by a view which holds merely
that we come to have beliefs about internal phenomena as a result of
inference from external statements. He could grant that position and
continue to insist that reasoning from external statements has no part
in the justification of our beliefs about the internal world. Peirce
fails to come to grips with the Cartesian tradition if he seeks to
establish only the derivation of beliefs.
Rene Descartes
,
Philosophical Writings
,
edited and translated
by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach. New York, 1971-
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I have emphasized the distinction between coming to know by infer-
ence and coming to believe by inference in order to make clear what
Peirce needs to show by the argument of Question Four. He must show
that those beliefs which constitute our knowledge of the inner world are
justified by inference from external statements. It does not suffice to
establish that we arrive at those beliefs by processes of reasoning
which begin with external statements. ET
,
if correct, probably does
provide good reason to accept some such assertion. But, Peirce needs to
do more. If ET is to provide an argument for the conclusion that our
knowledge of the internal world derives by inferences from external
statements, he must show that ET gives us good reason to suppose that
inferences from external statements play an essential role in the
justification of our beliefs about the inner world.
Keeping the above considerations in mind, let us return our attention
to Peirce’s argument in 5-21*7 that one’s knowledge that one is angry
derives by inference from the fact that some external thing is vile.
This argument presupposes a stronger version of ET than is required by
his later statements of that thesis. His claim bhat being angry ’’consists
in" judging that something is vile implies that one attributes vileness
to something external whenever one is angry. As I pointed out, the
later statements of ET may require only that such judgment accompany
anger at some stage in the subject's intellectual development. Like-
wise, the discussion in 5-21*7 suggests that, when the sugject is angry,
there is some external thing to which he ascribes vileness and not
merely that the subject makes a certain sort of judgment. Thus, the
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version of ET at work in 5-2^7 is what I have called the de re
interpretation of ET
.
In the strong version employed in 5-2^7, ET faces serious diffi-
culties. I may he angry because I believe that someone has stolen my
wallet and yet not believe of anyone in particular that he is the thief.
Peirce might maintain that in the sort of case described, the subject
ascribes vileness to an external situation or event, e.g., my wallet's
having been stolen, rather than to a person. But, an event of the
appropriate sort may likewise fail to occur. I may be angry in the
belief that my wallet has been stolen, even though I have merely lost my
wallet and no theft has taken place.
The objection above assumes that the thing which the subject thinks
vile is the thing toward which he directs his anger, the so-called
intentional object of his anger. Peirce might respond to this objection
by arguing that
,
although there is always some external thing which
seems vile to me when I am angry, that thing need not be the intentional
object of my anger. In "Consequences," 5-292, he conceded that when I
am melancholy
,
for example, I may not identify any particular thing as
the thing I am melancholy about. Nevertheless, he asserts, the feeling
of melancholy can "only come into consciousness through tinging the
objects of thought." What he means here, I take it, is that when one is
melancholy a peculiar quality of feeling suffuses one's experience and
one attributes this quality to virtually anything one encounters, without
thereby taking any of these as the object of one's mood. One's room,
the picture on the wall, the clouds seen from the window seem drab and
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depressing. Perhaps, in certain cases, anger acts on me in a similar
way. The people I meet on the street, the buildings I pass, appear
vile to me. I am not angry at the people or the buildings, but at
Jones, the man I believe to have stolen my wallet
. Even if Jones exists
merely in my imagination and my judgment 'Jones is vile' picks out no
external object, still my judgments concerning the people passing by in
the street do attribute vileness to real external objects. Peirce might
contend that whenever I am angry I successfully ascribe vileness to some
external thing, though the intentional object of my anger may fail to
exist in the external world.
Peirce's response does not meet the objection, however. Some
instances of anger resemble the case described above, but not all. My
anger may be very well focused. The only thing I think vile in certain
situations may be that my wallet has been stolen. I may have no tendency
to judge that anything else is vile. Supposing, in such a case, that no
theft has actually occurred, there will be no external thing I take to
be vile. Furthermore, even when my anger is a difuse tendency to judge
that anything I encounter is vile, all of these judgments may fail to
connect with the external world. Imagine me in the grip of a total
hallucination. I am angry because I believe, mistakenly, that someone
stole my wallet. Suppose that a quality of vileness suffuses my hallucin-
atory world. The man in the clown suit staring at me from the doorway
seems vile. So does the woman floating over my head and the huge rabbit
pursuing her. None of these judgments pick out anything external to my
delusion: nevertheless, I am angry.
II
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The counter-examples offered above do not conclusively refute the
Externalization Thesis
,
even in the strong version presupposed in Question
Four. I suggested previously that one ought to regard ET as an empirical
claim and that only a detailed psychological investigation would confirm
or refute. Peirce might well deny that any cases such as those described
in the preceding paragraph actually occur. Perhaps he would be right,
though I believe that the foregoing discussion creates serious doubts
concerning the strong version of ET. On the other hand, he might concede
the objection and adopt a weaker version of ET
. Since the problems
mentioned arise because the strong version of ET requires that the
subject’s judgment that something is vile actually pick out some external
object, it would be natural to weaken ET by moving to the de dicto
interpretation
.
In ius de dicto reading, ET stipulates only that, when the subject
is angry
,
he judges that some external thing is vile. The subject’s
judgment may fail to connect with any existing external object, but it
is an external judgment, i.e., a judgment which, in the subject's
intention, concerns something external. Unfortunately, the judgment
need not state an external fact. For that reason, the de dicto version
of ET fits uncomfortably into the argument of Question Four. Peirce
wants that argument to show that our knowledge of the internal world
derives from external facts. Given his refusal to commit himself to the
existence of an external world, 5.244, however, the notion of an external
fact is none too clear in "Questions". Perhaps his talk about external
racts does not exclude a de_ dicto reading of ET.
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In any case, the move to a oe dicto interpretation of ET avoids one
objection only to encounter another. Sometimes vhen one is angry one
does not even believe that any external thing is vile. I mlght be „,oveij
to anger by Thackeray's account of the escapades of Barry Lyndon without
ceasing to believe that I am reading a work of fiction and that there is
no such person as Barry Lyndon. Likewise, I may be angry about certain
of my own thoughts: 'What an abominable idea!', I might say to myself.
One could reply to the latter example that the judgment in question is
actually a judgment about myself, 'I am abominable for entertaining such
an idea,' and that I am, after all, an external object. Whether or not
I am an external object is, however, beside the point. I may not believe
that I am. I may think that I am an immaterial soul. Supposing that I
do so believe, I would not be judging that some external object is
abominable when I castigate myself in the terms indicated, above.
Peirce might defuse this objection by further weakening ET. He
could argue that the counter-examples above describe a subject who has
acquired a degree of sophistication concerning his internal states. To
judge that one is angry while withholding judgment or denying that any-
thing external is vile presupposes that one has a conception of internal
states as distinct from external conditions. He might offer ET as an
account of the subject's earlier, unsophisticated experience of the
internal world. Thus, Peirce might contend that our initial experience
of our own anger gets expressed in judgments that some external object
is vile, and that only after going through some process of intellectual
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development can we disassociate anger from beliefs about the external
world.
One may wonder whether the attenuated version of ET suggested above
can have the general epistemological consequences Peirce claims for ET
in Question Four. A more pressing question, however, is whether any
version of ET will support the argument of Question Four. Neither the
weak, variant of ET considered above nor the strong version presupposed
in Question Four says anything directly about what justifies the subject’s
belief that he is angry. At most ET asserts that, whenever the subject
is angry, he correctly takes some external object to be vile. It does
not say that he is justified in believing he is angry because he infers
that belief from the judgment that some external thing is vile. Peirce
needs to fill the gap between the psychological theory advanced in ET
and the epistemological conclusion of his argument in Question Four.
There is reason co doubt that Peirce can bridge this gap. Consider
what he must do to show that the internal statement 'I am angry' is
justified for the subject by inference from the external statement,
’This thing is vile. ’ I cannot provide a satisfactory general answer to
this question. But, at a minimum, it seems that, if a subject S is
justified in accepting a judgment P by reason of his having inferred P
from another judgment E, then S must also be justified in accepting E.
This condition does not capture everything involved in the notion of
justification by inference. It does represent a necessary condition,
however. If E is not warranted for S and P is, then wherever S gets his
I
warrant for accepting P it does not come via inference from E: E has no
warrant to lend.
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Certain instances of justification by inference may seem to consti-
tute counter-examples to the principle just proposed. Suppose that Mary
reasons as follows: It my ex-husband George attends the wedding, I
shall probably get angry because I can't stand the sight of him. On the
other hand, if he fails to attend. I'll probably get angry because he
hasn’t shown the common decency to appear at his own daughter's wedding.
Since George will either attend or not attend, I shall probably get
angry. Mary's argument could be represented as follows:
1. George attends the wedding.
2. If George attends then, probably, Mary gets angry.
3. George does not attend.
^ ^
^
George does not attend then, probably, Mary gets angry.
5- Either George attends or George does not attend.
6. If George attends or George does not attend then, probably,
Mary gets angry.
7- Therefore, probably, Mary gets angry.
(I have omitted certain obvious steps in the argument.)
One might argue that the conclusion, (j), is warranted for Mary by
inference from (l) and (3), among other premisses. Further, neither (l)
nor (3) need be warranted for her in order for the argument in question
to justify her belief that she will get angry. Thus, one might conclude,
Mary is justified in accepting (7) by reason of having inferred that
conclusion from (l) and (3), though neither premise need be warranted
for her. Of course, the argument in question contains premisses other
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than (1) and (3), but Peirce does not claim that 'This thing is vile’
must be the only premise occurring in the inference which justifies the
subject's belief that he is angry. Perhaps then the subject can justify
the belief that he is angry by inference from the premise that some
external thing is vile even though he is not warranted in accepting that
premise
.
Mary’s argument does not constitute a counter-example to the above
principle, however. Mary is not justified in believing that she will
get angry b^ reason of having inferred that conclusion from premisses
(l) and (3). An inference containing those premisses does justify the
conclusion for her, but the occurrence of (l) and (3) in that argument
is superfluous from the standpoint of justification. The argument in
question justifies here the conclusion even when those premisses are
deleted. V.hat justifies Mary’s belief that she will get angry is that,
as a matter of logic, either George will attend or George will not
attend, and that, as a matter of fact, either eventuality will make her
angry. Premisses (5) and (6) are the ones that justify Mary in accept-
ing (7 ) and she may use the argument in question to justify that con-
clusion only if she is warranted in accepting those premisses.
Keeping the foregoing discussion in mind, is it true that, whenever
the subject is warranted in believing that he is angry, that belief is
justified for him by inference from an external judgment such as 'This
thing is vile’? I mentioned previously certain cases in which the
subject is angry but does not judge that any external thing is vile.
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Similar cases suggest that the subject may be warranted in believing
that he is angry and not warranted in judging that something external is
vile. I may recognize that Thackery's account of Redmond Barry's behavior
toward the Countess of Lyndon has made me angry and understand perfectly
well that I refer to no actual person when I exclaim, 'That Barry is a
vile man.” Likewise, it seems that one suffering from feelings of
persecution may be warranted in taking himself to be angry, but not
warranted in concluding that some abominable external conspiracy is
directed against him. If cases such as those just described do occur,
then, in conjunction with the earlier remarks on justification by
inference, they show that the subject is sometimes justified in be—
that he is angry but not justified in so believing by inference
from the external judgment that something is vile. It seems that such
cases do occur.
The above objection suggests that Peirce is mistaken in believing
that our whole knowledge of the internal world is derived from observa-
tion of external facts.” However, he might be able to concede the
objection without sacrificing that conclusion. He might allow that one
may know that one is now angry without being warranted in judging that
something external is now vile, but contend that, at some earlier stage
of one's intellectual development, one's belief that one was angry must
have been justified by inference from an external judgment such as 'This
thing is vile.' By itself this concession comes close to giving up the
game. In Question Four Peirce claims to establish that we have no power
of introspection, not merely that we have no such power at some point in
ho
our intellectual development. Nevertheless, if he could establish that
our later ability to recognize the character of our mental states
depends upon our having gone through such a developmental stage, he
might be able to show that ve could not now be justified in believing
that we are angry unless we were, at some point, justified in believing
that various external things were vile
.
I shall not speculate about how Peirce might work out the sort of
argument suggested above. Clearly it will require a much more compli-
cated account of the derivation of one’s knowledge that one is angry
than he provides in Question Four. Further, he has yet to offer any
good reason for holding that one's warrant for believing that one is
angry ever derives by inference from the judgment that some external
thing is vile. If my discussion of the argument of Question Four has
discovered no crushing objection to that argument, it has likewise
failed to turn up any particular reason for accepting it.
Why this disappointing result? I think that the reason is that, in
’’Questions," Peirce fails to distinguish between explaining how one came
to have a certain belief and explaining how that belief is justified.
If accepted, the Externalization Thesis does provide grounds for sup-
posing that our beliefs concerning the internal world derive, in some
sense, from judgments about external objects. That is, the explanation
of how we came to have those beliefs will probably make reference to our
original externalized experience of the inner world. There may be no
acceptable version of ET
,
but that thesis is at least relevant to some
sorts of questions concerning derivation. Peirce fails, however, to
demonstrate its relevance to questions concerning justification. Since
these are the questions at issue between Peirce and Cartesianism
,
this
failure is serious.
The shortcomings of his argument in Question Four notwithstanding,
I believe that Peirce has plausible arguments for conclusions more
limited than, but similar to, his conclusion in Question Four. To
develop these arguments, however, one must go beyond the material
provided in Questions. I shall examine these more limited arguments in
Chapters IV and V.
CHAPTER III
INTUITION AND INFERENCE
In the argument of Question Four Peirce says nothing specifically
about the thesis that we have immediate or intuitive knowledge of the
inner world. He rejects this claim by implication when he maintains
that our whole knowledge of the inner world derives by inference from
external facts, but he does not consider the claim in its own right.
The topic of intuitive knowledge assumes a more prominent place in his
other two arguments concerning introspection. In both he contends
explicitly against the assertion that we know certain sorts of truths
about the incernal world intuitively , To evaluate these arguments one
needs to understand what Peirce affirms when he rejects intuitive
knowledge of mind. An understanding of his views on intuitive and
inferential knowledge also allows one to see more clearly just what
Peirce needs to establish in order to show that beliefs about the
internal world are justified by reference to external statements.
Under Question One, Peirce explains what he means by "intuition":
o . . The term intuition will be taken as signifying
a cognition not determined by previous cognitions
. . . and therefore so determined by something out
of the consciousness .... A cognition . . .
determined directly by the transcendental object, is
to be termed an intuition. ( 5 * 213 )
An intuition, then, is a cognition "determined" only by the object of
knowledge and not by other cognitions. He opposes intuition to
inferential knowledge which does involve the determination of cognitions
h2
^3
by other cognitions. Judging from Peirce's theory of mental activity in
"Consequences," for one cognition to determine another is for the two
cognitions to stand in some relation analogous to the relation between a
premise and the conclusion Ox an inference ^5*267) . As I argued in
Chapter II, Peirce's contention that judgments about the inner world are
determined by external judgments does not contradict the Cartesian
tradition unless determination involves justification. Working out the
inference which determines a given belief must explain the subject's
justification for so believing and not merely how he came by the belief
in question. It would seem, then, that when Peirce asserts that one's
knowledge of some truth is not intuitive, he supposes that one has
actually carried out an inference which justifies one in accepting that
truth.
The account of intuitive knowledge presented above creates certain
problems for Peirce. Consider, for example, a student who learns that
Marcus Aurelius was a Roman emperor and learns this as a result of
having been so informed by a recognized authority. In the normal case,
the student simply takes this information to heart without running
through any inference which justifies him in believing it. Plato would
deny that the student has acquired knowledge rather than true opinion in
the case described. Current views on when one knows something tend to
be permissive, however, and contemporary epistemologists generally allow
that one may obtain knowledge through unreflective listening and reading.
If these are not allowed as sources of knowledge, few of us know any-
thing about events we have not witnessed for ourselves. But, if
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the student in the case described above acquires knowledge of the
career of Marcus Aurelius, then, according to Peirce's account of
intuition, his knowledge is intuitive. The student does know and he
has not carried out any inference justifying his claim to know.
The case just described points up a serious problem for Peirce's
critique of introspection. We do not reflect much about our own mental
states. We seldom ask ourselves how we know that we believe, intend,
love or perceive. Nor do we often worry about what justifies us in
regarding such things as features of the internal world. Peirce never
suggests that
,
in the usual case
,
we do not know whether we intend to do
something, or that intending is a mental activity. Thus, given his
contention that we do not know such things immediately, it seems he must
claim that
,
under normal circumstances
,
we do carry out inferences which
justify our beliefs about our internal states. This claim appears
doubt ful
.
Peirce is well aware of the difficulties raised above and he confronts
them directly. How, he asks, does one know whether someone has carried
out an inference in a particular case? The obvious answer is that
,
when
the someone is 'another person, one asks, and when the someone is oneself,
one knows by introspection. Both responses suppose that the subject
can tell by introspection whether he has engaged in inference. But the
whole point of Peirce's discussion in Question One is to deny that this
is so. He argues that one may arrive at knowledge by inference without
being aware that he has made any inference
.
1+5
Peirce recognizes that he has some explaining to do here. At the
conclusion of "Question One" he writes:
-1- ° remains only to explain why the orevious
cognitions which determine J a conclusionj are
not more clearly apprehended.
. .
. Just
as we are able to recognize our friends by
certain appearances, although we cannot
possibly say what those appearances are and
are quite unconscious of any process of
reasoning, so in any case where the reason-
ing is easy and natural to us, however
complex may be the premisses
,
they sink
into insignificance and oblivion proportion-
ately to the satisfactoriness of the theory
based upon them. (5-223)
I take Peirce to be saying in 5-223 that in cases where the reasoning
involved is of a sort in which one is well -practiced and where the con-
clusions arrived at by this sort of reasoning are usually correct, or at
least not disconfirmed, one focuses on the conclusion and does not
attend to the reasoning by which it was obtained.
Leaving aside, for the moment, questions about the plausiblity of
this account, Peirce still has something to explain. If one cannot tell
by introspection whether one has inferred a given judgment
,
how does one
discover whether a particular bit of knowledge is inferential? His
answer, in Question One, is that one should decide whether the subject
knows some fact immediately or inferentially by considering which alterna-
tive is most plausible in light of the facts of the case in question.
One should consider the nature of the thing known, what sort of contact
the knower has with that thing, what sorts of cognitive processes and
abilities one may reasonably ascribe to him. Thus, the following dis-
cussion in 5-222:
The pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity
of the succession of the vibrations which
reach the ear
. Each of these vibrations
produces an impulse upon the ear. Let a
single such impulse be made upon the ear,
and we know, experimentally, that it is
perceived. There is good reason, therefore,
to believe that each of the impulses forming
a tone is perceived. . . . Therefore, the
pitch of a tone depends upon the rapidity
with which certain impressions are successively
conveyed to the mind. These impressions must
exist previously to any tone; hence, the
sensation of pitch is determined by previous
cognitions. Nevertheless, this would never
have been discovered by the mere contemplation
of that feeling.
Here Peirce argues that the sensation of pitch (which is a thought,
something on the order of a judgment, according to Peirce) is determined
by previous cognition. He bases his view on an account of what pitch is
and how we perceive it. The strategy employed resenbles that of his
argument from the Externalization Thesis to the claim that knowledge of
the internal as internal is inferential. That is, he first explains
what we experience when we encounter the phenomenon of pitch and then
argues that we must make some inference in order to get from knowledge
of what is presented in that experience to knowledge of the phenomenon
itself.
In "Questions" Peirce does not rest his argument for the inferenti-
ality of inner knowledge entirely on his account of internal phenomena
and our experience of them. He also seeks to establish that we have
available to us evidence from which conclusions about the internal can
be inferred. This part of his argument is important because, as Chapter
II shows, arguments from psychological theories concerning the nature of
experience to conclusions about our knowledge of what experience reveals
are not likely to conclusively rule out the Cartesian account of inner
knowledge
. In Questions Two and Three, for example, he argues that we
need not suppose that the subject has immediate knowledge of self or
that he can distinguish intuitively among the various sorts of mental
states. We need not make these suppositions, Peirce says, because there
are other things which the subject is in a position to know from which
he may infer either the existence of self, or that he is in such and
such a sort of mental state.
At this point, a weakness in the strategy of "Questions" becomes
appai ent . To show that our knowledge of some truth about the internal
world must be inferential, it does not suffice to show that there is
evidence available from which one could justifiably infer that truth.
One might know immediately that p and also have at one's disposal
evidence from which one could infer that p. In Questions Two and Three
Peirce argues that we need not suppose that the subject has intuitive
knowledge of the inner world. To show the hypothesis of inferentiality
provides a better explanation of the facts concerning our inner know-
ledge than the hypothesis of immediacy, he must do more than show that
we could get by without the latter hypothesis.
One who holds that the subject knows immediately that p is committed,
not to the claim that the subject has no evidence for p, but to the
claim that he is justified in believing that p whether or not he has
such evidence. What Peirce needs to establish is that the subject
cannot be justified in believing that p without having evidence for p.
148
That is, he needs to show that, for any statement p about the subject's
inner world such that the subject knows that p, there is a body of
statements, e_^
,
.
. e
n ,
each distinct from p, such that (i) the truth
of ei’ c ' ‘ » en constitutes evidence for the truth of p, and (ii) the
subject is not justified in believing that p is true unless he is
justified in accepting e.
,
. .
.
,
e . If Peirce can establish that
n
conditions (i) and (ii) hold for an internal statement p, he will have
shown not only that the subject has evidence for p, but also that the
subject’s being justified in believing that p is conditional upon his
being justified in accepting such evidence.
Clearly, it will often prove difficult to say, regarding a particu-
lar internal judgment, whether the conditions mentioned above are satis-
fied. To give a general account of the circumstances under which condi-
tions (i) and (ii) hold for any statement requires nothing less than
developing a theory evidence and confirmation. Wo such theory is readily
available and I shall not attempt to devise one. I think that it will
be sufficient for ray purposes to consider Peirce's specific suggestions
concerning the sorts of statements which can serve as evidence for
judgments about one’s internal world and to ask, first, whether it seems
that these statements do have the evidentiary force he ascribes to them,
and second, whether it is reasonable to hold that the subject is justi-
fied in accepting the inner judgment in question, supposing that he is
not warranted in accepting the evidentiary statements. I shall get down
to such specific cases in the next two chapters.
k9
Before proceeding with that discussion some further comments are in
order. In Question Four and, apparently, in his later critique of
introspection, Peirce maintains, not merely that inner knowledge is not
immediate, but that it derives from external facts. This further claim
can be expressed using the characterization of inferential knowledge
worked out above. One need only add to conditions (i) and (ii) a third
condition stating that some of the statements e.
,
. .
.
,
e satisfying
(i) and (ii) are external statements.
A final question remains concerning Peirce's account of inferential
knowledge. Suppose he has established that, for some inner judgment, p,
there exists a body of statements e..
,
. .
.
,
e satisfying conditions
(i) and (ii) . Given that the subject knows that o is true, does the
above result make it reasonable to suppose that the subject has carried
out an inference justifying his belief that p? Neither (i) nor (ii)
actually requires that the subject have inferred p from e., . . ., e in1 n
order to know that p. (i) stipulates that e
,
. .
.
,
e
n
constitute
evidence for p; (ii) that the subject is not justified in believing that
p, unless he is also warranted in accepting e^
,
. .
. ,
e
n
Nothing is
said about inference. Perhaps, in general, the existence of a body of
evidence satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) relative to some judgment p
does create a presumption in favor of the claim that, if the subject
knows that p, he has justified his belief that p by inference from e^ , .
.
., e
n
- But there would seem to be cases where that presumption is
defeated. Peirce admits, as we have seen in 5.223, that the subject may
know that p, although he is not conscious of having inferred that p and
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cannot even explicitly formulate premisses from which p could he inferred.
Such circumstances seem to provide good evidence that the subject did
not infer that p and, given that he knows that p, that he knows without
having inferred, i.e., he knows intuitively that p.
Not so, says Peirce. The subject did infer that p in the case
described it is just that his inference was unconscious. This
response leads to further difficulties, however. Peirce concedes that
the subject may be unable consciously to reconstruct the reasoning which
justifies a particular belief. "We are able to recognize our friends by
certain appearances, he says, "although we cannot possibly say what
those appearances are" 5*223. But, if the subject cannot consciously
formulate an inference justifying his belief, what reason has Peirce for
supposing that he can do so unconsciously? The subject's inability to
work out an explicit argument justifying his belief would seem to be
strong evidence that he is incapable of carrying through such reasoning,
consciously or otherwise.
Peirce might deal with the above objection in a way recommended by
Gilbert Harman. . ^ Harman wants to show that what he calls "ordinary
perceptual knowledge" is inferential. He notes that certain philoso-
phers have rejected this claim on the following grounds:
It is clear that there is no conscious reasoning
in ordinary perception. How could there be if
we are not conscious of the premises of
this reasoning? And philosophers have suggested
that it is pure obscurantism to suggest that
there is unconscious reasoning from unconscious
premises, especially since such reasoning would
have to be "instantaneous." (p. 19)
’'’Gilbert Harman, Thought , Princeton, 1973, pp. 19-20.
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Harman replies to this line of argument by standing it on its head.
A difficulty with such arguments is that they
require the assumption that we have an indepen-
dent way to tell when inference has occurred and
when it has not .... However
,
the only way to
discover when a person mah.es an inference is to
discover what assumptions about inference are
needed to account for his knowledge. We can
turn the arguments just considered on their heads.
Knowledge of the world is based on inference. If
there is knowledge of the world in perception,
then there is inference in perception. If we
are not conscious of the inference
,
then there is
unconscious inference. If it would have to be
instantaneous, then inference takes no time. If
we were not aware of the premises, then we can
make inferences without being aware of the
premises of those inferences. (p. 20)
Although it may be possible to brazen out any objections to un-
conscious inference, it would be better not to rely on this problematical
notion. The move to the hypothesis that the subject engages in uncon-
scious inference is motivated, in the context under consideration, by
the assumption that, if the subject is justified in believing that p,
then he must have actually justified his belief that p, or at least be
able to justify that belief. Bruce Aune
,
in some comments on a paper by
pJames Cornman, has challenged this assumption. Aune points out that we
sometimes grant that a person has knowledge, even though he is unable to
construct an adequate justification for the relevant belief. A passing
acquaintance with the literature on skepticism suffices to show that
,
although philosophers have found it extraordinarily difficult to formulate
Bruce Aune, "Review of Cornman," unpublished.
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convincing arguments for such beliefs as that an external world exists,
or that other people have minds, they are unwilling to deny that they
are justified in holding these beliefs.
I shall not try to present Aune's position in any detail. I
mention his view primarily in order to suggest that it is by no means
clear just what the subject must do to be justified in accepting a
particular belief,. For this reason, it is unwise to make the issue
between Peirce’s and the Cartesian’s account of inner knowledge turn on
suppositions concerning the reasonings in which people actually engage.
The Cartesian holds that merely being in a given mental state or
experiencing a particular internal phenomenon justifies the subject in
claiming inner knowledge
,
independently of any other sorts of evidence
the subject may have available. If Peirce can show that there is
evidence bearing on one's inner judgments, that one is not justified in
claiming inner knowledge unless one is also justified in accepting such
evidence
,
and that merely being in or experiencing a mental state does
not justify one in accepting such evidence, he will have shown that the
Cartesian account of inner knowledge is not adequate. Questions about
how the requirements for inner knowledge just mentioned are satisfied
in the cognitive activities of human subjects can be put aside as problems
for a general theory of knowledge.
CHAPTER IV
THE ARGUMENT OF "CONSEQUENCES"
Peirce's second argument concerning whether we have a power of
introspection is less ambitious than his argument in Question Four. In
the latter argument he regards as introspective "any knowledge of the
internal world not derived from external observation" (5.244). He
defines introspection more narrowly in the second argument : "By intro-
spection I mean a direct perception of the internal world" (5.244). The
notion of direct perception here employed is an epistemological one.
The question at issue is whether we have intuitive or immediate know-
ledge of the internal world. Further, Peirce's second argument concerns,
not our whole knowledge of the internal world," but only our knowledge
of mental operations or activities: "As for the mind's watching its own
operations, no such thing is possible. . . . The real operation of
thought is something purely inferential" (7-376). What is at stake in
the second argument is whether the subject knows immediately that he is
engaged in a given sort of mental operation, for example, whether he is
reasoning, intending, willing, or sensing. Had he succeeded in showing
that all our knowledge of internal things derives by inference from
external facts
,
Peirce would need no separate argument for a negative
answer to the question just raised. The failure of his earlier argument
does not rule out a negative answer to this question, however. Internal
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knowledge may be derived, i.e., non-intuitive
,
without having been
derived from external facts.
Peirce best expresses his reasons for holding that we do not
directly perceive our own mental operations in "Some Consequences of
Four Incapacities, an essay published in 1868 as a companion piece to
"Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man." He explains
his position regarding direct perception of mental operations in the
course of working out a general theory of mental activity. In order
to present his second argument, I must first expound that theory. My
exposition will occasionally draw on his later works, but all references
in the text are to "Consequences" unless otherwise noted.
Peirce's theory of mental activity
Among the constituents of the inner world, Peirce distinguishes
feelings, thoughts or ideas, and modes of thought. I have borrowed the
term "mode of thought" from Descartes. Peirce uses it occasionally
(5-291, for example) but I shall use it generally. The modes of thought
include activities such as sensing, imagining, willing, and reasoning,
as well as things usually conceived as dispositions or states, for
example, beliefs, intentions, and emotions. The term "mode of thought"
recommends itself both because it is neutral between activities and
dispositions, and for other reasons which will become apparent when
Peirce theory of mental activities has been presented.
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Concerning feelings Peirce writes
:
Take whatever is directly and immediately in
consciousness at any instant, just as it is,
without regard to what it signifies, to what
its parts are, to what causes it, or to any or
its relations to anything else, and that is what
letens meant "by Feeling; and I shall invariably
use the word in the same sense. (7-5^0, From
an untitled manuscript, circa 1900.)
Peirce discusses feelings in his theory of mental activity pri-
marily in order to contrast them with thoughts and modes of thought.
For this purpose he emphasizes two points in his account of feelings
:
(l) Feelings, as such, are essentially non-relational. In themselves,
they do not signify any objects and they have no logical relations to
other feelings or to thoughts. A feeling is a feeling because of its
intrinsic features and not in virtue of its relations to other things.
As Peirce puts it in "Phaneroscopy” (1907): "By a feeling I mean an
instance of that sort of element of consciousness which is all that it
is positively, in itself, regardless of anything else" (1.306) (2)
Feelings can be present in an instant. They are not processes which it
requires time to complete. Any temporal segment of a feeling of a given
kind is itself a feeling of the same kind. Quoting again from "Phaner-
oscopy": . . if [ a
J
feeling is present during a lapse of time, it is
wholly and equally present at every moment of that time" (1.306). As
we shall see, the first feature distinguishes feelings from thoughts and
the second marks off feelings from modes of thought.
The theory of mental activities in "Consequences" presents Peirce's
first account of thoughts and of the various modes of thought. His
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later writings add considerably to his descriptions of the different
modes and his taxonomy of modes changes from time to time. Nevertheless,
the basic account set out in "Consequences" remains substantially
unchallenged in his subsequent works. According to that account, to
engage in any sort of mental activity or to be in a mental state of a
given type, is to think in certain ways, i.e., to have or be disposed to
have certain sorts of thoughts. (Hence, the appropriateness of the term
"mode of thought .
"
)
Since thoughts are the constituents of every sort of mental activity,
Peirce opens his account of the modes of thought with some remarks on
the nature of thoughts. Every thought, he maintains, involves a sign.
"Whenever we think we have present to the consciousness some feeling,
image, conception, or other representation which serves as a sign" ( 5 . 283 ).
Peirce uses the term "thought-sign" to refer to this representational
element within a thought and sometimes to the thought itself. In order
for something to serve as a sign three conditions must be fulfilled.
Now a sign has, as such, three references: first,
it is a sign to some thought which interprets it;
second, it is a sign for some object to which in
that thought it is equivalent; third, it is a
sign, in some respect or quality, which brings
it into connection with its object. (5-283)
Taken together the features mentioned above might be called the
rational qualities of a sign. These qualities determine the sign's
place in reasoning and discourse. All three raise questions of inter-
pretation. The first may be explained roughly as follows: In order for
something to be a sign, it must be a sign to someone. For something to
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be a sign to someone is for someone to interpret it, i.e., the sign must
suggest some object to the interpreter and, perhaps, indicate to him
something about that object. This might be put by saying that the
interpreter must have some thought relating the sign to its object and
to some information about that object. Thus, there must be some thought
which interprets the sign.
The second condition seems more obvious: the sign must designate
some object. But it is not clear from Peirce's discussion in "Conse-
quences" whether every sign actually picks out some object. At one
point he maintains that, if a sign designates an object, it does so
indirectly, through some connection with other thoughts, and allows that
a sign may fail to pick out any "outward" object, even indirectly.
What does a thought-sign name, what is its
suppositum, for what does it stand? The
outward thing, undoubtedly, when a real out-
ward thing is thought of. But still, it is
determined by previous thoughts of the same
object: it only refers to the object by
denoting this thought. ( 5 * 285 )
Elsewhere, however, Peirce contends that a sign must have a "real,
physical connection . . . with its object, immediately or by its connection
with another sign" (5*287)* (Be calls this real, physical connection
the pure demonstrative application of a sign, 5*287*) This suggests
that ultimately every sign denotes some real object.
The third feature is difficult to explain. Peirce seems to suppose
that a thought-sign not only picks out an object, but also predicates
something of that object. He says, for example, that we cannot simply
think of Toussaint L' Overture: we must think of him as something, or
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under some description; as a man, a negro, a general, or as the liber-
ator of Haiti, for instance. So interpreted, the third condition
amounts to the claim that thought-signs have a subject-predicate form.
This may ecplain why Peirce frequently refers to the thing designated
by a thought-sign as the sign's "subject." (See 5-292, for example.)
Perhaps it would be best to express the third condition as follows:
every thought-sign occurs in the context of a thought which predicates
something of the object of that sign. In any case, this is the best I
can do with the third condition except to refer the reader to Peirce's
own discussion in 5-286.
In addition to its rational qualities a sign has certain material
qualities .
Since a sign is not identical with the thing
signified, but differs from the latter in
some respect, it must plainly have some
characters which belong to it in itself,
and have nothing to do with its represen-
tative function. These I shall call the
material qualities of a sign. (5-287)
Peirce offers an analogy in this connection between thought-signs and
word-tokens, e.g., man . The rational features of the word-token are
its denotation and meaning. Its material qualities are a certain
shape, color, location and so forth. The specific material qualities
of the word-token are accidental from the point of view of the token's
function in literal discourse and reasoning, but they serve to distin-
guish this particular token and, presumably, the word-type associated
with this token can enter into discourse only in some material embodiment.
So in the case of thought-signs, the sign must have some material
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qualities which distinguish it from other thought-signs and by means of
which it appears in the thinker's consciousness (see 5.287 and 7.356,
Logic_, 1873, for Peirce's development of this analogy.)
According to Peirce, the material qualities of thought-signs are
qualities of feeling. "Every thought," he remarks, "is, so far as it
is immediately present, a mere sensation, ... a mere feeling," 5 . 289 .
Thus, thoughts, considered merely as events in consciousness are ensem-
bles of material qualities, feelings. They possess, in addition, however,
a natural nature which accounts for their representational and logical
properties. A sign's specific material qualities are irrelevant to its
rational nature.
The foregoing exposition is intended to set the stage for a discus-
sion of Peirce's critique of introspection, rather than as contribution
to the literature on his remiatic theory. Hence, I shall not follow up
the questions it raises concerning the relation between thoughts and
their objects. For my purposes it suffices to emphasize two points:
first, something is a sign in virtue of its bearing certain relations to
other thoughts -~ those thoughts which interpret it — and, perhaps
,
to
some object, and second, the material qualities of a thought-sign do not
account for its representative function or its place in reasoning.
Thoughts, in Peirce’s view, are the constituents of all mental
activities. The basic type of mental activity is cognition. Indeed, he
maintains that "we must , as far as we can do so . . . , reduce all kinds
of mental action" to cognition, 5. 266-. 267 . By cognition, Peirce does
not mean an atomic act of knowing. Cognition is a process of thought-
6o
sign interpretation. That is, a cognition forms a sequence of thoughts
each member of which is determined by earlier members according to the
laws of mental association." These laws are simply the principles of
valid reasoning - deductive, inductive, and abduct ive or hypothetical.
Cognition, then, is a process of inference ( 5 .266- . 282 )
.
The above account leads Peirce to conclude that cognition cannot be
instantaneous. The succession of thoughts is a temporal succession
occupying a lapse of time. For this reason, he argues, a cognition
cannot exist in the mind at any one instant, but only in a relation
among thoughts present at different times.
At no one instant in my state of mind is there
cognition or representation, but in the relation
of my states of mind at different instants
there is. (5.289)
Again, in a letter to W. T. Harris explaining the two essays of 1868
,
he
writes :
I do not say that we are ignorant of our state
of mind. What I say is that mind is virtual,
not in a series of moments
,
not capable of
existing except in a space of time — nothing
so far as it is at any moment. (8.2U8)
Peirce contrasts cognitions so conceived with feelings or sensations.
Two sorts of objects, what we are immediately
conscious of and what we are mediately conscious
of, are found in all consciousness. Some ele-
ments (the sensations) are completely present
at every instant so long as they last, while
others (like thoughts [here used to mean
processes of thought/ ) are actions having
beginning, middle, and end, and consist in
a congruence of sensation which flow though
the mind. They cannot be present to us,
but must cover some portion of the past or
future. (5.395, "The Fixation of Belief.")
6l
The point of this comparison is not just that cognition covers a
lapse of time; feelings also have duration. But, in the case of a
feeling, a sensation of red, for example, any temporal segment of that
feeling will itself be a sensation of red. Not so for cognitions. The
duration of a cognition is taken up by various distinct thoughts. These
are not themselves cognitions. Since all that can be present at a given
instant while cognition is in progress is a thought and, since Peirce
maintains that all that can be present to the mind is what can be
present in an instant
,
he argues that cognitions can never be present to
the mind.
Peirce offers just such an argument in his Logic of 1873. Suppose,
he says
,
that one idea has determined another.
Now when this happens
,
after the first idea
comes the second. There is a process which
can only take place in a space of time; but
an idea is not present to the mind . . .
during a space of time in which this idea is
replaced by another; for when the moment of
its being present is past
,
it is no longer in
the mind at all. Therefore, the fact that one
idea succeeds another is not a thing which in
itself can be present to the mind. ( 7 - 3 ^8 )
Cognition and introspection
The account of cognition presented above helps to explain why
Peirce denies that we can directly perceive our own cognitions. Intro-
spective perception is supposed to reveal the subject's current mental
state: that is, it reveals what is present in the mind at the time the
perception occurs . But
,
a cognition c anno ^ oe present in the mind at
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any instant, and hence, not at the instant of perception. Direct
perception can disclose to the subject only that which can be present in
an instant and a cognition will never be there to be perceived.
If one supposes that introspective perception is analogous in some
way to ordinary sense perception, the argument just presented seems
rather hasty. In the first place, it suggests that one could not
perceive anything that takes time, for example, a snake’s slithering
across the road. But it seems that one who has continuously attended to
the snake during the entire period it took him to get across the road
could properly be said to have perceived the snake’s passage. Why not
suppose, then, that the subject can inspect the contents of his mind
continuously through a lapse of time long enough to encompass a cog-
nition? Surely, if the subject has continuously attended to a cognition
from beginning to end, he has perceived that cognition. Furthermore,
granting that one cannot perceive an entire cognition in an instant,
does it follow that one cannot perceive a cognition in an instant? Thus
far, Peirce has not denied that one can perceive a part or a stage of a
cognition in an instant. Sometimes perceiving a part of a thing counts
as perceiving the thing itself. One cannot, for instance, directly
perceive an entire opaque cube — all six sides — in an instant.
Nevertheless, if ordinary usage is any guide, it seems that directly
seeing only the facing surface of a cube counts as seeing the cube.
Might not directly perceiving a part of a cognition count as perceiving
a cognition?
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To understand why Peirce restricts introspective perception to
instantaneous glimpses and why he denies that directly perceiving a part
of a cognition counts as directly perceiving the cognition itself, one
must realize that certain epistemological considerations govern his talk
about introspective perception. What can be directly perceived, in his
view, is what can be known by direct perception. The notion of knowledge
by direct perception provides one way of explaining what Peirce means by
intuitive or immediate knowledge. An intuition is an instance of
knowledge arising from a sort of direct intellectual contact with an
object and not determined or mediated by other thoughts (5.213). Thus,
when he asks whether cognitions can be directly perceived, he is address-
ing the question of whether one can know by direct perception, i.e., by
intuition or immediately, that one is engaged in cognition.
Considered in this light, how would Peirce respond to the claim
that the subject can continuously attend to each stage of a cognition
and hence be said to perceive the entire cognition? He would reply as
follows: At any given time t at which the subject is attending to a
cognition, he has before him only what is present at t. But, to know
that he is engaged in cognition, he must know that the mental contents
present at t were preceded by or will be followed by something else.
Can his direct contact with what is present at t give him such knowledge
all by itself? No, his perception at t can give him such knowledge only
if it is supplemented by other thoughts; memories of what happened at an
earlier time, anticipations of the future. Nor can his perception of
6h
the contents of mind at some earlier time t-n give him knowledge at t of
his earlier condition, unless that previous perception is recalled at t.
Therefore, continuous perception of a cognition results, at best, in a
succession of independent acts of knowing each revealing only the
contents 01 mind at a particular instant. For this reason, Peirce
maintains that one can directly perceive only what is present in an
instant
.
The same reasoning explains why perceiving a part of a cognition
does not count as perceiving a cognition. Such perception, unmediated
by other thoughts
,
can result only in knowledge of things present in
that portion of the cognition and not in the knowledge that these things
constitute a segment of a cognition. Thus, Peirce f s restrictions on
introspective perception arise from epistemological motives. He denies
that cognitions can be directly perceived because he denies that they
can be directly known.
I have suggested that concerns about the Cartesian doctrine that
one has immediate knowledge of the modes of thought lie behind Peirce's
discussion of introspective perception. Talk about direct perception
and knowledge by direct perception is not, perhaps, the most perspicuous
way of dealing with that thesis. The metaphor of direct perception
occurs frequently enough in Cartesian discussion of introspection to
justify Peirce’s use of the notion in his criticism of those accounts.
Nevertheless, it is a metaphor and one may reasonably wonder whether the
arguments presented above do not depend upon taking that metaphor too
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literally. Further, the notion of knowledge by direct perception needs
to be clearly explained. Such an explanation must provide an account of
what it is for a bit of knowledge not to be 'mediated’ by other thoughts.
Thus, it looks as though one needs to develop an account of immediate
knowledge in order to explain knowledge by direct perception. That
being the case, why not put the discussion in terms of immediate knowl-
edge in the first place?
For the reasons given above, I propose to rephrase Peirce's remarks
on direct perception of cognition in terms of the account of immediate
knowledge presented in Chapter III. Adopting that account, one would
ask whether Peirce can show that, in order for the subject to be justi-
fied in believing that he (the subject) is engaged in cognition, there
must be a statement or body of statements, e.. .
., e such that (i) thei n
truth of e^
,
. .
.
,
e constitutes evidence for the truth of the subject's
belief that he is engaged in cognition, and (ii) that the subject is not
warranted in so believing unless he is also warranted in accepting
e. ..... e . If Peirce can show that this is the case whenever one
l n
knows that one is engaged in cognition, he will have defeated the claim
that one has such knowledge immediately.
Peirce emphasizes that cognition consists in a relation holding
among various thoughts. Indeed, he maintains that even a particular
thought is something essentially relational: a given mental occurrence
constitutes a thought only if it stands in a certain relation to other
thoughts which interpret it and to some object of which it is a sign.
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This is at least part of what he means when he declares that a thought
has no intellectual significance for what it is in itself, hut only for
what it is in its effects upon other thoughts" (7.357). As we have seen
Peirce exploits the relational nature of thinking in his arguments
concerning introspective perceptibility. I believe that this conception
of thought also provides him with an argument against immediate knowl-
edge of cognition.
Consider iirst the case of an individual thought. What distinguishes
having a thought from merely entertaining a bit of mental imagery?
According to Peirce a thought is distinguished by its rational qualities.
These involve, among other things, that the thought have an interpreta-
tion in other thoughts. Having an interpretation, as he understands
that notion, is not merely a matter of having an analysis in terms of
other thoughts. What he means primarily is that a particular thought
must have a place in a system of reasoning; conclusions can be drawn
from it, it can state evidence, formulate an hypothesis, be derived as a
conclusion from other thoughts.
The above suggests that all thoughts are, as it were, in the
indicative mood -— that all express statements. However, I think that
with slight changes in his account of the rational relations between
thoughts, Peirce can take account of imperative and interrogative
thoughts, for example. He argues that the principles governing rational
relations between thoughts are just the principles of valid inference,
deductive, inductive, and hypothetical. On this scheme it would be
6?
difficult to account for rational relations between inductive and non-
mdicative thoughts, as well as for such relations among non-indicative
thoughts. The various attempts to formulate a logic of questions or a
logic of imperatives, for example, suggest that it is possible to formulate
principles governing the relations of these sorts of thought among
themselves and to thoughts of other types. By adding such principles to
his theory of mental action, Peirce could extend it to cover non-
indicative thoughts.
Given the foregoing account of what it is to be a thought, Peirce
can plausibly maintain that
,
in order for one to know that some segment
of one's mental activity constitutes a thought, one must be justified in
believing that it has an interpretation, i.e., that one could draw
certain conclusions from it and derive it as a conclusion from other
thoughts. Further, one's ability to incorporate some mental content in
reasoning provides evidence that it has intellectual significance and,
hence
,
evidence that it is a thought . Thus
,
Peirce can show that
,
in
order for one to be justified in believing that one has a thought, one
must also be justified in accepting certain other statements, statements
concerning the thought's rational relations to other thoughts, which
provide evidence for the claim that one has a thought.
One might object that Peirce's account ties thoughts too closely to
sentences or statements. Perhaps some thinking is conducted in non-
verbal images. Likewise, one might charge that his account of thinking
is too restrictive. In addition to various sorts of logical reasoning,
thinking perhaps involves non-logical associations among ideas. Even
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granting these contentions, however, the strategy of the argument
present above remains promising. Peirce could argue that no mental
process counts as thinking unless it proceeds according to some princi-
ples, though these be merely laws of association, and that, for some
mental content to be a thought
,
it must be related by some such princi-
ples to other thoughts. He could then press a weaker epistemic claim
than the one made above: in order for the subject to know that he has a
thought 9 he must be justified in believing that this 'thought' is
related to other thoughts according to some principles of inference or
association. The possibility of non-verbal or non-logical thought does
not constitute, therefore, a major obstacle to a Peircean argument
against immediate knowledge of thoughts.
Turning to cognition as such, Peirce can again avail himself
of an argument based on the rational features of thinking. A cognition,
as he understands that notion, is an instance of reasoning. In order to
know that one is engaged in reasoning, it does not suffice that one know
that one has gone through a sequence of thoughts. What distinguishes
reasoning from mere reverie is that in reasoning one's thoughts proceed
according to certain sorts of rules: that is, according to rules having
to do with the logical features of thought, as opposed to, say, associ-
ations arising from past experience or resemblances between the "material
qualities" of various thoughts. Whether the subject's thoughts are so
related will depend upon what is thought, i.e., upon whether the state-
ments expressed in one's thoughts do follow according to some set of
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rules, rather than upon the subject's intention to reason according to
such rules. Thus, one's justification for believing that a sequence of
thoughts conforms to certain principles ultimately depends upon an
analysis of the argument expressed in those thoughts. The discovery
that the statements expressed do constitute an argument according to a
particular set of rules will tend to confirm the claim that the sequence
of thoughts in which this argument is expressed counts as an instance of
reasoning
.
One might object to the above argument on the following grounds: It
is frequently very difficult to determine by exactly what logical
principles one's thoughts are connected. Indeed, it is an intellectual
accomplishment of the highest order to elucidate the general principles
governing ordinary forms of inference, and we are not now in a position
to so elucidate many forms of inference. It seems unwise, therefore, to
require that the subject know by what principles his reasoning proceeds
in order to know that he is reasoning. Peirce denies that this require-
ment is too strong. He recognizes that people can engage in inference
without knowledge of the principles of that inference. But he argues
that such cases do not involve reasoning
,
strictly speaking. "Such a
1Such a discovery does not conclusively establish that the subject
reasons. Whether the subject is reasoning
,
unlike the question of
whether his thoughts are related according to a set of rules, does
depend upon the subject's intentions and intellectual dispositions.
A student reciting from memory a passage in a logic text may be enter-
taining a sequence of thoughts related according to a set of rules
,
but his recitation will not constitute reasoning unless, for example,
it is done attentively, with understanding, or with the intention to
demonstrate some conclusion. Imagine someone constructing a rhyming
syllogism in order to produce a poem.
TO
process, he says, "should he called, not reasoning, hut an acritical
inference
,
" 5 . UUl (issues of Pragmatic ism) . According to Peirce the
subject cannot know that he is reasoning unless he has knowledge of the
principles on which his reasoning is based, because he denies that the
subject can be said to reason at all in the absence of such knowledge.
Whatever the justice of Peirce's contention, one need not insist on
his view of reasoning for the sake of the argument against immediate
knowledge of cognitions. That argument requires only that the subject
be warranted in believing that his thoughts are related by some princi-
ples of inference. He need not know by which principles. The rationale
for this requirement is that the subject could not plausibly be said to
possess any conception of reasoning unless he realizes that reasoning
involves some principles by which different thoughts are connected.
Presumably the subject cannot know that he reasons unless he possesses
some recognizable conception of what it is to reason. Perhaps one need
not know what it is to reason in order to reason, just as, perhaps, one
need not know that one is reasoning in order to reason. But this
observation does not tell against the claim that one cannot be justified
in believing that one reasons, unless one is also justified in believing
that one's thoughts, in this instance, are related by some sort of
principles
.
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Introspection and emotion
The foregoing discussion shows that Peirce has a plausible argument
against the claim that one knows immediately that one is thinking or
reasoning. He wants to establish that one lacks immediate knowledge
regarding any mode of thought. Judging from his procedure in "Conse-
quences, he believes he can establish this more general conclusion by
first assimilating the other modes of thought to cognition and then
appealing to his earlier demonstration that cognitions cannot be known
by direct perception. Thus, his argument that one cannot know intuitively
that one intends
,
or wills
,
or that one is in a particular sort of
emotional state, for example, seems to depend upon whether he succeeds
in reducing all types of mental activity to cognition. As we shall see,
his argument must be more complicated that this presentation suggests.
In "Consequences," 5-291-.298, Peirce undertakes to show that
"every sort of modification of consciousness is an inference" ( 5 . 298 ).
Actually, he discusses only sensation, emotion, and attention. Since
the cost in time and pages of adequate treatment even of these three is
prohibitive, I shall focus on what Peirce regarded as the hardest case
for his theory, the emotions, and confine myself to a few brief remarks
on sensation and attention. My account of his views on the emotion will
illustrate Peirce’s general strategy and indicate the sorts of problems
it encounters.
Turning first to sensation, we must understand the difference
between sensation and feeling. Peirce makes this task more difficult
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than it need be by occasionally talking about "sensations” when he means
"feelings." He uses "sensation" in this way in "Consequences" 5 . 289
,
Every thought
. . . is, so far as it is immediately present, a mere
sensation
.
. a mere feeling." Similarly in "A Guess at the Riddle”
(1890), he says. We know that there is no resemblance between memory
and sensation, because
. .
. nothing can resemble an immediate feeling"
(1.379). (For other instances see 1.308, 1.310, and 5-395.) In "Conse-
quences" 5.291, however, "sensation" refers to a mode of thought involving
the judgment that an object has some quality. This judgmental account
of sensation reappears in "Questions" 5.21+5 and in "How to Make Our
Ideas Clear" where Peirce remarks that "All sensations
. . . emerge into
consciousness in the form of beliefs" (5-1+06). On this view sensations
are similar to, if not identical with, what he later calls "perceptual
judgments," 5.115-.H6, Lectures on Pragmatism (1903). For the sake of
completeness, I should add that he eventually adopts still another
account according to which a sensation consists of two elements, a
feeling and "the consciousness of being compelled" to have that feeling
7 . 5 ^ 3 .
Peirce's argument in "Consequences" 5-291 that sensation involves
inference proceeds in much the same way as his argument regarding the
emotions. Indeed, he says in 5-292 that the same sort of thinking
occurs in both sensation and emotion, and that the two modes are to be
distinguished by reference to the kinds of bodily "motions" to which
each gives rise. For this reason, my presentation of his views on
emotion will serve to indicate how he deals with sensation.
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ihe remarks on attention, 5 *295-
-297
,
raise a number of problems.
Peirce offers a very different story about attention than he tells about
sensation and emotion. Attention is not a kind of thinking at all,
rather "attention is the power by which thought at one time is connected
with or made to relate to thought at another time" (5.295). Nevertheless,
he maintains that attending involves a process of enumerative induction.
Attention is roused when the same phenomenon
presents itself repeatedly on different
occasions, or the same predicate in different
subjects. We see that A has a certain charac-
ter, that B has the same, that C has the same,
so that we say, "These have this character."
Thus attention is an act of induction; but it
is an induction which does not increase our
knowledge, because our "these" covers nothing
but the instances experienced. It is, in
short, an argument from enumeration. (5.296)
This attempt to portray the attending as a kind of induction is rather
strained. One would think that attention is as likely to be roused by
novelty or dissimilarity as by the recurrence of some phenomenon or predi-
cate. Doubtless Peirce adopts the account he does because he equates
attention with the power of abstraction, 5
-295, hut that equation raises
doubts in its own right. It seems the better part of valor to forbear
further discussion of Peirce's views on attention.
Proceeding with the account of emotion, Peirce writes in 5 * 292 :
There is no feeling which is not also a represen-
tation, a predicate of something determined
logically by the feelings which precede it. For
if there are any such feelings not predicates,
they are the emotions. Now every emotion has a
subject. It a man is angry, he is saying to
himself that this or that is vile and out-
rageous. If he is in joy, he is saying "This
is delicious." ... In short, whenever a
man feels, he is thinking of something.
5.292 calls to mind the view Peirce expressed in Question Four,
5.22,, that every emotion has a "subject," i.e., an object, and consists
in a judgment that something has a certain property. But, nothing said
thus far suggests that emotions are inferences. His argument for this
claim apparently comes in a passage immediately following the one quoted
above
.
The emotions
,
as a little observation will
show, arise when our attention is strongly
drawn towards complex and inconceivable circum-
stances. Fear arises when we cannot predict
our fate. ... If there are some indications
that something greatly for my interest
,
and
which I have anticipated would happen, may
not happen; and if, after weighing probabilities
. . . I find myself unable to come to any fixed
conclusion in reference to the future, in place
of the intellectual hypothetic inference which
I seek, the feeling of anxiety arises. When
something happens for which I cannot account,
I wonder .
. . . Thus an emotion is always a
simple predicate substituted by an operation
of the mind for a highly complicated predicate.
(5.292)
A careful reading of the above passage reveals that Peirce does not,
in fact, maintain that emotions are inferences. He asserts rather that
they arise by a process similar in some respects to hypothetical reasoning.
What he claims later in 5.292 is merely that "the analogy of the parts
played by emotion and hypothesis is very striking." He compares the
emotion to the hypothesis in a hypothetical inference and not to the
inference as a whole. Thus, his final account in "Consequences" seems to
be that an emotion is a judgment that arises from other thoughts in a way
2
analogous to hypothetical inference.
2
For a discussion of Peirce’s theory of the emotion more detailed
than the one I shall present, I refer the reader to David Cavan*
s
"C. S. Peirce's Semiotic Theory of Emotion," Proceedings of the
International Peirce Congress, Amsterdam, 1976 , forthcoming.
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Though Peirce affirms that emotions are judgments, he does not deny
that they involve feelings
. In general
,
he holds that any thought
,
considered simply as an episode in consciousness, is a feeling, and
throughout the passages quoted he refers to emotions as feelings. They
are not, however, merely feelings. They exhibit the rational features
distinctive of thoughts: representation, predication, and interpre-
tation. These features figure importantly in Peirce's argument that the
emotions are not merely various kinds of feelings. A feeling, as such,
is simply an immediate consciousness of some quality. It has no rational
relationship to any thought and it signifies nothing beyond itself.
Since emotions are both rationally related to other thoughts and directed
toward objects, they cannot be mere feelings.
Peirce’s theory of the emotions immediately encounters two objec-
tions. The first, and more limited of these objections, is that some
emotions, moods such as melancholy, for example, seem not to be directed
toward any particular object. I have already discussed Peirce's answer
to this objection in Chapter II. He regards melancholy as a disposition
to attribute some quality, a peculiar deadness, perhaps, to the objects
one experiences while the mood persists. Though the melancholy man does
not judge that some particular object is the thing about which he is
melancholy, his mood does involve a tendency to make certain sorts of
judgments. This approach seems plausible. In any case, most emotional
states do involve the idea of some object toward which one directs one's
feelings
.
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The second, more radical objection, denies that emotions involve
judgments. Infants and brutes are often said to have emotions, but it
seems unlikely
,
particularly in the case of brutes
,
that they have any
thoughts. One might reject the claim that animals have emotions, but
Peirce forecloses this option. "My dog," he asserts, "has the same
emotions of affection as I . . . . You would never persuade me that my
horse and I do not sympathize, or that the canary bird . . . does not
feel with me" (I.31U "Lectures on 'Pragmatism")
. Given his account of
emotion, then, Peirce apparently ascribes thoughts to his dog and his
horse. Such ascriptions of thought strike many philosophers as very
implausible. Their objections usually boil down to contention that
thought in some way requires langauge and the observation that, except
perhaps in a few special cases, e.g.
,
apes who have learned human sign
language, animals possess nothing properly called a language.
There are several such arguments in the literature. I shall
consider a version presented by Bruce Aune. J
In thinking (as cats are often said to do) that
the mouse will run into its hole as soon as it
sees you, the agent is conceptualizing a situation
in a particular way; he is distinguishing items
of reality in just the way that these items are
distinguished by men who use such words as "mouse,"
"hole," "run," "see," and "you." If, consequently,
we are to credit the cat with the literal ability
to entertain the thought just mentioned ... we
must also credit it with a whole battery of thing,
activity, and semantic concepts. Yet we have the
best of reasons for believing that these concepts
3Bruce Aune
,
Knowledge
,
Mind, and Mature . New York, 1967 , pp.
219-220.
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could not "be attained without mastery of a very
complicated language — indeed, a language that
is formally analogous to our own. Surely no one
with a clear head would actually want to credit
lower animals with conceptual schemes of this
sort
.
Peirce would certainly agree with Aune ' s point that one cannot
reasonably attribute a particular thought to a subject unless one also
grants that the subject has a conceptual system within which to inter-
pret and fix the denotation of the thought in question. It is not clear
how complicated a language a beast must possess in order to master a
conceptual system sufficient for thinking some thought formally analo-
gous to the thought that something is vile, or delicious, for example.
Nevertheless, even the suggestion that dogs and horses possess a very
simple language and correspondingly simple conceptual system seems
highly speculative at best.
Putting aside for the moment Peirce’s commitment to the thoughts of
animals, let us ask on what grounds people attribute emotions to animal.s
.
One reason, stated crudely, is that animals look as though they have
emotions. That is, they exhibit facial expressions and patterns of
behavior similar to those exhibited by human beings undergoing certain
emotional experiences. A more general reason is that some instances of
animal behavior can be explained on the supposition that they have
emotions. (I am not assuming here that "explained" means "correctly
explained.") But these are the same sorts of grounds people give for
ascribing thoughts to animals. An ape’s facial expression may sometimes
resemble that of an angry man, but it may also resemble the expression
78
of a roan vh,G is curious, or puzzled, or cogitating on some problem.
Likewise
,
just as the hypothesis that a dog is afraid or happy may
his behavior
,
so the supposition that a dog knows, remembers, or
infers something may explain, for example, his ability to find his way
home from a strange place. The evolutionary argument that human abili-
ties differ only in degree from the capacities of lower animals also
applies to both emotion and cognition.
It seems then that our evidence for ascribing emotions to animals
is not much better, or much worse, than our evidence that they think.
One might maintain that, since emotions are only feelings, and since one
needs no linguistic competence in order to feel, it is less implausible
to believe that animals have emotions than that they think. But whether
emotions are only feelings is the point at issue. Whatever Peirce's own
views on the emotions of animals
,
the supposition that animals have
emotions does not lead to a decisive objection against Peirce's theory
of the emotions. One's decision about whether brutes have emotion
depends in part on what one thinks emotions are.
Supposing that emotions are not merely feelings, what are they
according to Peirce? No clear answer to this question emerges from
"Consequences." It will not do to characterize anger, for instance,
simply by reference to the judgment that something is vile, abominable,
or outrageous. The judgment that something is vile occurs in a variety
of different emotional states. It often expresses cool contempt or
disdain rather than anger. Given someone with the right (or the wrong)
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sort of character, the Marquis de Sade comes to mind, that judgment might
indicate pleasure. Likewise, one may judge that something is out-
rageous, i.e., worthy of outrage or tending to evoke outrage, without
being ouoraged at the time one so judges
, Anger involves more than
thinking that a thing is vile or outrageous. Presumably Peirce regards
the occurrence of a judgment such as ’This thing is vile’ as a necessary
condition for the subject’s being angry. But he does not say what
conditions he considers necessary and sufficient for anger.
Though he does not offer an analysis of any emotion, Peirce clearly
maintains that every instance of an emotion involves some thought. It
may seem that this is all he needs in order to show that we have no
immediate knowledge of our emotional states. His earlier argument
establishes that we have no immediate knowledge of thoughts and his
theory of the emotions indicates that every emotion involves a thought.
But a problem arises here. To say that emotions are thoughts is not to
say that they must be known as_ thoughts . According to Peirce's argument
concerning intuitive knowledge of thoughts
,
one cannot know that some-
thing is a thought unless one is justified in believing that it bears
certain relations to other thoughts. This shows that to know that an
instance of emotion is a thought
,
one must be justified in ascribing to
it certain connections with other thoughts. He has not yet shown,
however, that in order to recognize that one is angry, or in some other
kind of emotional state, one must know that one’s current mental state
is a thought. Indeed, this supposition appears doubtful. It seems that
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a man who "believes that emotions are merely feeling could know whether
he is angry, or happy, or in a state of anxiety.
In 01 der to apply the sort of argument he used regarding knowledge
of cognitions
,
Peirce needs to establish that one cannot know that one
is in a given emotional state unless one is justified in believing that
this state has certain sorts of connections with other thoughts. To see
whether he can provide a plausible argument here, I shall return to the
problem of formulating necessary and sufficient conditions for someone’s
being angry. I do not propose to offer Peirce’s analysis of anger, or
even an analysis. I hope, rather, to make certain points about what one
needs to know in order to know that one is angry.
I have already argued that having the thought that something is
vile is not a sufficient condition for being angry. Supposing that it
is a necessary condition, what more does anger involve? Remarks in
"Consequences" suggest three sorts of further conditions. First, Peirce
says that, "That which distinguishes both sensations and emotions proper
from the feeling of a thought, is that in the case of the former two the
material quality is made prominent" (5.29^). Extending this comment a
little, one might contend that what distinguishes angrily thinking that
something is vile from dispassionate occurrences of the same thought is
that in the former case the subject attends particularly to the material
qualities, i.e., qualities of feeling, associated with the thought.
Taking this a step further, one might mark-off instances of anger from
instances of other sorts of emotional states by reference to some special
8l
quality cf feeling accompanying all and only instances of anger.
Peirce does say that there is a quality of feeling characteristic
of anger. In "C . S. Peirce’s Semiotic Theory of Emotion," David Savan
maintains that Peirce unequivocally rejects any such suggestion.
According to Savan, he denies that "immediate feelings can distinguish
annoyance from joy, or from any other emotional state."'*1 Savan bases
this claim on an argument that, according to Peirce, "all immediate
feelings are alike." I shall not consider Savan ’s argument for his
interpretation. A few quotations will suffice to show that Peirce is by
no means uniformly hostile to the claim that different modes of thought
may be distinguished by reference to qualities of feeling. In the Logic
of 1873 he writes:
Doubt and belief are two states of mind which
feel different
,
so that we can distinguish
them by immediate sensation. (7-313)
Closer to home, he remarks under Question Three in his earlier essay of
1868 that "We can unquestionably distinguish a belief from a conception,
in most cases, by means of a particular feeling of conviction" (5-242).
If belief and doubt can be so distinguished, why not anger and contempt?
Perhaps Savan discovers an inconsistency in Peirce's views about immedi-
ate feelings. He does not show that Peirce must deny that various types
of emotions exhibit characteristic differences in qualities of feeling.
Whatever Peirce would say about the above proposal, is it plausible
in its own right? It does seem that various sorts of feeling usually
Savan
,
ojd . cit
.
,
p . 6
.
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accompany anger. People frequently describe that emotion in terms
having to do with fire or heat. Anger flares up: one burns, boils, or
simmers with the emotion. But do such feelings arise only in case of
anger? A man may burn with anger, but also with curiosity. Excitement
flares up and simmers. Suppose that the subject takes something to be
vile and at the same time experiences a hot, burning feeling. Does this
supposition guarantee that the subject is angry about the thing in
question? It is not clear that it does. Given a certain sort of
emotional constitution one might be intensely curious or excited by that
which is vile. The thought that something is vile may occur to a man
burning with excitement or curiosity rather than with anger.
Perhaps our use of terms such as "burning" to desribe both curi-
osity and anger merely indicates that our vocabulary fails to capture
certain fine distinctions among feelings. If so, that represents a
problem in itself. In order to characterize anger as a kind of thought
accompanied by a certain sort of feeling, one needs to say what sort of
feeling. It is notoriously difficult to describe precisely the feelings
associated with emotional states. This problem makes it doubtful that
one can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for anger by refer-
ence to qualities of feeling.
Some comments in 5.293 suggest a second approach. There Peirce
distinguishes emotion from sensation by noting that certain "animal
motions" accompany the former but not the latter.
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The animal motions to which I allude are, in
the first place and obviously, blushing,
blenching, staring, smiling, scowling,
. .
.,
etc., etc. To these may, perhaps, be added,
in the second place, other more complicated
actions.
. . ,
Among the animal motions produced by the various emotional states
,
one
might try to discover certain sorts of overt bodily symptoms characteris-
tic of anger. If successful, one might propose that the subject is angry
if, and only if, he judges that something is vile and certain animal
motions accompany his judgment.
Though I shall not explore any such account in detail, the above
proposal appears unpromising. Even supposing that the subject cannot be
angry without exhibiting some overt symptoms
,
he can be angry without
exhibiting any particular set of symptoms one can describe solely by
reference to overt bodily changes. (It would not be very informative to
say merely that a man is angry if, and only if, he exhibits the sorts
of overt symptoms associated with anger.) The subject can get angry
without scowling, clenching his fists, gnashing his teeth, turning red,
or physically attacking the object of his anger. Further, many bodily
symptoms associated with anger appear in connection with other emotions
as well. A man in the grip of excitement may turn red, grind his teeth,
and pound his companions with his fists. In short, the prospects for
distinguishing anger from other emotional states by reference to associ-
ated animal motions appear bleak.
In "Consequences" Peirce hints at yet another approach. In 5-292
he characterizes anxiety as an emotion arising as a result of certain
sorts of thoughts .
3U
if thei e are some indications that something
greatly for my interest, and which I have
anticipated would happen, may not happen;
and after weighing probabilities
,
. .
. I
find myself unable to come to any fixed
conclusion in reference to the future, in
place of the intellectual hypothetic inference
which I seek, the feeling of anxiety arises
.
This suggests that one might be able to distinguish among the different
emotions by reference to the sorts of thoughts from which they arise.
How to Make Our Ideas Clear" (1878) contains another hint in this
direction. There Peirce writes that the various modes of thought "are
distinguished by having different motives, ideas, or functions" (5.396).
One might put this by saying that what distinguishes an instance of
anger from instances of other emotions is the context of thought in
which it occurs. Instances of anger are characteristically motivated by
the thought that one, or something in which one takes an interest, has
been threatened, injured, or wronged. Thus, although contempt may
involve the same sort of judgment as anger, "That thing is vile," e.g.,
one can distinguish between instances of the two emotions by reference
to the sorts of thoughts that precede that judgment.
One may also discriminate anger from other emotions by reference to
thoughts consequent upon the emotion. Imagine, for example, that a
sadist observes the neighborhood bully twisting a child's arm. He
believes that the child is being wronged and he thinks it vile, but
these thoughts excite rather than anger him. In the case imagined, the
subject's initial thoughts, and perhaps even his feelings, are of a sort
that might occur in anger. Nevertheless, differences between anger and
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sadistic excitement may emerge when one considers subsequent thought.
The sadist, since he takes pleasure in the bully's action, presumably
wishes that it continue. The angry man, by contrast, will be disposed
to search for a means to end it. That is, he will have certain thoughts
directed toward punishing the bully or making him desist.
It seems preferable to talk about subsequent thoughts rather than
ovei t actions in. this context, because the suoject may be angry with the
bully ana yet take no overt action against him. However, it does seem
plausible to suppose that, whether or not the subject acts overtly, he
will at least desire that the bully stop and consider what he might do
to accomplish this end. Perhaps an appropriate course of action will
occur to him immediately and he will act on it straight-away
. Perhaps
he will be paralyzed by fear or will decide that other matters more
urgently require his attention and so refrain from taking any action.
For similar reason, he may suppress other overt symptoms of his anger.
I shall not attempt to work out an analysis of anger along the
lines suggested above. My primary concern is to see whether Peirce can
plausibly deploy against the claim that one knows immediately the nature
of one’s emotional states an argument similar to his argument against
immediate knowledge of thoughts. The foregoing discussion provides
reason to believe that he can. Recall the argument concerning knowledge
of thoughts. Peirce maintains that, in order to know that some mental
content is a thought, one must be justified in ascribing to it certain
sorts of connections with other thoughts . In the case of the emotion
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anger
5 a similar claim seems reasonable. Can the subject be justified
m believing that he is angry rather than, say, contemptuous or excited,
merely on the basis of an inspection of a present thought or feeling?
The presence of a particular sort of thought or feeling does not reli-
ably distinguish anger from the latter two states. Whether the subject
is justified in regarding a given mental state as an instance of anger
depends, at least in part, upon what he is justified in believing about
the context of thought in which it occurs. Whether the judgment that
something is vile arises from the belief that someone has been injured
or wronged, or in the course of a merely aesthetic appraisal, is a
factor the subject should take into account in deciding whether that
judgment expresses anger rather than contempt. To know that he is
burning with anger and not with curiosity or excitement, he needs to
know something about the thinking which precedes or flows from his
current state.
Thus it seems reasonable for Peirce to deny that one can know
immediately whether one is angry. Statements describing the context of
thought in which an emotion state occurs do serve as evidence for the
truth or falsity of the claim that one is angry. Further, it is reason-
able to suppose that the subject is not justified in believing that he
is angry unless he is also justified in accepting some such evidence.
Finally, it does not seem reasonable to suppose that the subject could
be justified in believing that his current mental state occurs within a
certain context of thought merely by virtue of his being in or being
conscious of the mental state in question.
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I should emphasize that the argument i have envisioned for Peirce
does not require that he able to provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for someone's "being angry solely "by reference connections
between instances of that emotion and other thoughts. So far as that
argument is concerned
,
the correct analysis of "anger" might involve
reference to qualities of feeling or animal motion. Indeed, anger might
be a mere leeling rather than a thought. The argument requires only
that whatever anger may be, it is recognizable as anger only in the
context of certain sorts of thoughts . I have discussed how one might
state necessary and sufficient conditions for someone's being angry only
as a way of showing that it is reasonable to suppose that the subject
must be justified in believing certain things about his other thoughts
in order to know that he is angry.
The foregoing discussion suggests a general strategy Peirce might
employ in arguing against the Cartesian account of our knowledge of the
various modes of thought. In essence, this strategy consists in arguing
that the distinguishing features of any mode of thought are relational:
that is, in order to know that one is engaged in a particular sort of
mental activity, one must be justified in accepting certain statements
concerning the relation of present contents of mind to things no longer
or not yet present. Peirce adopts this strategy in his discussion of
thought and cognition and I have tried to show how he might apply it to
a particular emotion. To decide whether he would successfully extend
the sort of argument suggested to volition, intention, or to the other
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emotion requires a case by case examination. Nevertheless, the argument
in the caoe of anger indicates that he has some prospect of success.
CHAPTER V
KNOWLEDGE of the internal as internal
The notion of introspection in Peirce's post-1868 works differs
from that employed in "Questions." Under Question Four he says, "By
introspection, I mean a direct perception of the internal world, but not
necessarily a perception of it as internal" (5.2UU). His remark indi-
cates that introspective knowledge of internal phenomena need not involve
the knowledge that those phenomena belong to the inner world. This
account contrasts both with the only definition of introspection I can
find in his later works — "Introspection is the direct observation of
the operations of mind as mental operations" (7.376) — and with the
whole tenor of his later discussion of the topic. The following quota-
tions, taken respectively from Minute Logic (1902), "Issues of Pragmatism"
(1905), ana a review of Pearson's Grammar of Science (1901), provide a
representative sample of that discussion.
I must confess myself to be of that party
which thinks that no psychical fact, as such,
can be observed. . . . Everything in the
psychical sciences is inferential. Not the
smallest fact about the mind can be directly
perceived as psychical. (1.250)
Introspection is wholly a matter of inference.
One is immediately conscious of feelings, no
doubt
,
but not that they are feelings of an
ego
, ( 5 .^ 62 )
In a certain sense there is such a thing as
introspection: but it consists in an inter-
pretation of phenomena presenting themselves
as external percepts . We first see red and
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blue things. It is quite a discovery when we
find that the eye has anything to do with
them, and a discovery still more recondite
when we learn that there is an ego_ behind the
eye, to which these qualities properly belong.
( 8 . 14 )4 )
Each of the preceding passages concerns the subject’s knowledge of
the psychical as psychical. It is precisely this sort of knowledge
Peirce regards as inferential. He takes it for granted that the subject
has knowledge of or, at any rate, is conscious of qualities of feeling.
What he maintains is that the subject does not know immediately that
such qualities belong to "an ego behind the eye," that they are a part
of the subject’s inner world.
In the present chapter, I shall explore Peirce's reasons for
holding that we do not know immediately that internal phenomena are
internal. The view that we have no immediate knowledge of the internal
as internal must not be confused with the doctrine I earlier called The
Externalization Thesis. The Externalization Thesis asserts that the
subject initially ascribes qualities of feeling to external objects. As
such, it is a psychological thesis and makes no claim about knowledge.
The view I shall consider here concerns, not how the subject comes to
attribute qualities of feeling to himself, but what justifies such
attributions. Nor shall I confine my discussion to qualities of feelings.
The question at issue is whether the subject knows intuitively that any
feature of his inner world, be it a feeling, activity, or state, belongs
to that world. After I have discussed Peirce’s argument against immedi-
ate knowledge of the internal as internal, I shall inquire whether he
can use that argument to rescue a restricted version of his claim that
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inner knowledge derives from external facts.
Internality and externality
Before considering what sorts of evidence might be relevant to the
judgment that a phenomenon belongs to the inner world, one needs to know
what it is for something to belong to that world. Peirce examines the
notion of internality, and its compliment, externality, at some length.
The earliest detailed discussion appearing in the Collected Papers occur
in an untitled manuscript, circa 1873.
That is external to the mind which is what it
is, whatever our thoughts may be on any sub-
ject : just as that is real which is what it
is, whatever our thoughts may be concerning
that particular thing. Thus
,
an emotion is
real, in the sense that it exists in the mind
whether we are distinctly conscious of it or
not. But, it is not external because although
it does not depend upon what we think about
it, it does depend upon the state of our
thought about something. (7-339)
He reiterates this position in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear." Here he
distinguishes figments, reals, and externals.
A figment is a product of somebody's imagina-
tion: it has such characters as his thought
impresses upon it. That whose characters are
independent of how you or I think is an
external reality. There are, however,
phenomena within our own minds
,
dependent
upon our thought, which are at the same time
real in the sense that we really think them.
But though their characters depend upon how
we think, they do not depend upon what we
think those characters to be. (5-^05)
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The above passages suggest that the external is that which is in-
dependent of, the internal that which is dependent upon, "the state of
our thought. The passages define non-relative internality and exter-
nality. Presumably, that which is internal relative to a given person
is that which depends upon the thought of the person in question. Thus,
for Peirce
,
internality is thought—dependence
,
externality thought-
independence
.
This way of characterizing the internal and the external requires
explanation. Many unproblematic ally external objects exist and ’are
what they are 1 because someone had certain thoughts: for example,
artifacts -— things constructed with certain intentions or purposes —
and bodily movements resulting from volition or emotion. I do not think
that Peirce wants to consign such things to the inner world, though in
some sense they depend upon someone’s thought.
It may seem that the problem just mentioned is easily disposed of,
but it raises a larger issue for Peirce than one might suppose. Peirce
denies that anything that can be conceived or known is entirely thought-
independent .
But, if it be asked us whether some realities
do not exist which are entirely independent of
thought; I would in turn ask what is meant by
such an expression and what can be meant by it
.
... It is clear that it is quite beyond the
power of the mind to have an idea of something
entirely independent of thought
,
. . . and
since there is no such idea, there is no mean-
ing in the expression. (7.3^5 Same source
as 7.339 on preceding page.)
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The view expressed above represents an enduring feature of Peirce’s
metaphysics. In "Questions," 1868, he writes, "If I think 'white' I
will not go so far as Berkeley and say that I think of a person seeing,
hut I will say that what I think of is in the nature of a cognition, and
so of anything else that can he experience" ( 5 . 257 ). Forty-one years
later, "Some Amazing Mazes: Fourth Curiosity" reaffirms that, "what we
think of cannot possibly he of a different nature than thought itself"
(6.339). Thus, if the external is that which is entirely thought-
independent, Peirce seems to deny that we can know or even conceive of
external things. But, his works contain numerous passages suggesting
that we have knowledge of an external world. This problem probably
explains the diffidence concerning the existence of an external world he
expresses in Question Four, 5.2UU.
Peirce attempts to deal with the problem raised above by intro-
ducing a subtle distinction between what, in the language of "Question"
5.2U7, "is relative to human nature or to mind in general" and what is
relative to some mind or minds in particular. He introduces this distinc-
tion into his treatment of internality and externality in a discussion
of color in "Some Amazing Mazes," 1909 .
Any object whose attributes, i.e., all that
may truly be predicated, or asserted of it,
will, and always would, remain exactly what
they are
,
unchanged
,
though you or I or any
man or men should think, or should have
thought as variously as you please, I term
external
,
in contradistinction to mental . For
example, a dream is mental, because it
depends upon what passed in the thoughts of
the dreamer whether it be true that the dream
9 ^
vas of a dog, or was of the Round Table of
King Arthur, or of anything else. On the
other hand, the colors of human experience
and in particular the contrast between the
colors of the petals of a Jaqueminot rose and
that of the leaves of the bush, although it
is relative to the sense of sight, is not
mental, in my sense of that word. (6.327)
By saying that color is relative to the sense of sight, he means
that the various color terms are defined by reference to "normal
chromatic sensations." Sensations are thoughts: hence
defined by reference to something mental, and whether a
red, for example, would seem in some way to depend upon
think
,
in Peirce's broad sense of "think." However, he
is meant by normal chromatic sense is not "the average"
chromatic sensations that people have had or will have,
he writes, "is not the average of what actually occurs.
,
color terms are
given object is
how human beings
maintains
,
what
of all the
"The normal ,"
but of what
would occur, in the long run, under certain circumstances" (6.327).
Colors are relative to thought, but not to what particular people do.
did, or will think. Peirce concludes:
So, in general
,
what I mean by external might
vary with how persons of a given general
description would think under supposable
circumstances : but
,
it will not vary with
how any finite body of individuals have thought,
do now think, or will actually think. (6.327)
I am not interested in the theory of color propounded above, but in
the conception of externality. Peirce has made clear that the thought-
independence which characterizes the external world concerns the actual
thoughts of particular persons. There may be some sorts of things which
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can be conceived only by reference to mind, nevertheless, such things
can be external provided that their "attributes
.
.
. remain exactly as
they are
,
• * • though you or I or any man or men should think
,
or
should have thought as variously as you please." A thing may be relative
to mind, without being dependent upon particular minds.
Tnis new characterization of externality does nothing, however, to
resolve the first problem mentioned. Indeed, it makes it possible to
state that problem in a more serious form. Peirce calls external, "any
object whose attributes, i.e., all that may truly be predicated of it,
will, and always would, remain exactly what they are . .
. though you or
I or any man or men should think, or should have thought as variously as
you please" (6.327). Given this account, it seems that nothing which
is, or will be, an object of human thought is external. To illustrate
the problem here, let us consider Pike's Peak, presumably a. paradigmatic
external object, and the predicate "is admired by all Americans."
Whether this predicate truly applies to Pike's Peak depends upon the
attitudes of present Americans toward that mountain. If it is truly
admired by all Americans, it has that attribute because you and I and
various other persons have certain thoughts. Should some American cease
to admire Pike's Peak, the mountain would lose the attribute in question.
Apparently then, given the account of externality in 6.327, Peirce would
consign Pike's Peak to the internal world. A similar case can be made
regarding anything that is or could be an object of thought. Peirce
denies that one can meaningfully talk about something which could not be
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an object of thought. (See "Questions" 5. 254 -. 258 in addition to the
previously cited 7.339-
)
It seems, therefore, that nothing one can
meaningfully discuss or think about is external in the sense of that
term defined in 6.327.
Despite his belief that anything thought about somehow partakes of
the nature of thought, Peirce would not welcome the above conclusion. He
intends in 6.327 to develop a serviceable way of distinguishing among
the possible objects of thought which things are external and which
mental. He undertakes his discussion of color precisely in order to
show that colors belong to the external rather than to the internal
world. That discussion fails to uncover an adequate criterion for
externality
.
I do not know how Peirce would have dealt with the objection raised
above. There are, however, several ways of distinguishing the internal
and the external which avoid the difficulties just mentioned while
remaining faithful to his basic approach. For example, one might
characterize the thought-dependence of things internal by reference to
the conditions necessary for their existence rather than by considering
all that may be truly predicated of them. Let us say that an internal
phenomenon is one which exists at a given time t just in case someone
thinks or is disposed to have certain thoughts at t. (Here "things"
and "thoughts" should be taken in Peirce's broad sense of those terms.)
I have used the disjunction, "thinks or is disposed to have certain
thoughts," because some internal phenomena are such that they may exist
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in the suoject at times when he is net mentally active. We may say of
a man asleep or temporarily unconscious that he desires to "be king or
believes thao he is king, for instance. Such states are plausibly
conceivea as dispositions to have certain occurrent desires or beliefs
under appropriate conditions. Thus, on the account here presented they
are internal phenomena.
An external object is a thing which can exist at a time t even though
no one thinks at t or is disposed to do so. The need to account for the
externality of artifacts explains the introduction of a temporal variable
in the above formulations. One might hold that a work of art cannot
come into existence unless someone has had certain thoughts. The grounds
for such a claim would be, I suppose, that something cannot be a work of
art unless it was produced with, or as a result of, certain intentions.
If this claim be accepted, then the assertion that a work of art exists
entails that someone has thought. Nevertheless, once a piece of art
has been created it can continue to exist regardless of anyone's thoughts.
Thus, artifacts count as external objects because they can exist at times
when no one thinks or is disposed to have any thoughts.
Adopting the above criterion, Peirce can allow that a thing is an
object of thought without thereby consigning it to the inner world.
Though some of its attributes depend upon how particular people think.
Pike's Peak remains firmly grounded in the external world since it can
exist however anyone may think. Other characterizations of internality
and externality might serve as well, but the account offered is a
fairly obvious development of Peirce's own account which meets the
objections previously mentioned.
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I should point out that the notions defined above are non-relative
To define internality and externality relative to a particular person,
one merely replaces "someone" and "no one" in the foregoing definitions
with the name of the person in question. For a phenomenon to belong to
the inner world of a particular individual is for it to be dependent
upon that person's thoughts.
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Evidence for internality
The preceding section explains what Peirce means by saying that
something is internal or mental. I shall now consider his account of
how one knows whether a phenomenon belongs to one ’ s inner world
.
Descartes believed that little could be said in answer to the question
here raised.
What then am I? A conscious being. What is
that? A being that doubts, understands, asserts,
denies, is willing, is unwilling; further, that
has sense and imagination. These are a good
many properties - if only they all belong to
me. But how can they fail to? Am I not the
very person who is not doubting . . . who under-
stands . . . and asserts, . . . who is willing,
. . . who imagines. . . . Even if I am asleep,
even if my creator does all he can to deceive me;
how can any of these things be less of a fact
than my existence? Is any of these something
distinct from my consciousness? Can any of them
be called a separate thing from myself? It is
so clear . . . that I cannot think how to explain
it more clearly.^
Descartes apparently regards "Is any of these something distinct
from my consciousness?" as a rhetorical question; Peirce takes that
question seriously. Peirce argues that one cannot tell intuitively
whether a particular phenomenon belongs to one's Internal world and that
several kinds of evidence bear on the hypothesis that a thing is inter-
nal. In "A Guess at the Riddle", 1890 , he writes:
. . .
The only consciousness we have of /activity J
is the sense of resistance. We are conscious . . .
of meeting with a fact. But whether the activity
l-Rene Descartes
,
Philosophical Writings , translated and edited by
G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach . New fork, 1971 » PP* 70— fl.
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is within on without we know only "by secondary signs
and not by our original faculty of recognizing fact.
(1.376)
What sorts of "secondary signs" serve to indicate the location of a
phenomenon? Peirce suggests three sorts of tests.
When a new image
,
optical, acoustical, or other,
appears in the mind, one subjects it to various
tests in order to ascertain whether it be of
internal or external provinance. These tests
may be distributed into three classes, according
to their strength when they testify to externality
of origin (which I call. being "affirmative") and
according to their strength when they testify to
internality of origin (which I call being "negative").
Class I. Affirmatively, the strongest; negatively,
the weakest
.
Tests by physical concomitants; as by photography,
phonography, seismography
,
chemical test papers, and
a great variety of other physical apparatus and obser-
vation .
Class II. Affirmatively and negatively of middling
value
.
Tests by the testified experience of other
observers, or even of oneself at another time,
placed in nearly the same circumstances.
Class III. Affirmatively, the weakest; negatively,
the strongest.
Criticism of all the circumstances of the appari-
tion, ending with the readiest and, in case its
evidence should be negative, the most conclusive of
all single tests, namely that of making a direct in-
ward effort to suppress the apparition. (6. 333-. 33^,
"Some Amazing Mazes: Fourth Curiousity", 1909)
These tests embody various assumptions about internal and external
things. Class I tests presuppose, roughly speaking, that the external
is physical. External phenomena will interact in regular ways with
other phenomena and these interactions may take place in the absence
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of human observers. This assumption applies to the non-relatively
external. The mental activities of other persons are external relative
to a given subject, but they do not form a part of what Peirce calls the
external world. The reason Peirce does not consider such relatively
external phenomena in devising his tests for externality is, I would
guess
,
that he supposes that the mental states of others never "appear"
before the subject's mind and, hence, the subject has no occasion to ask
whether they belong to his internal world.
Peirce calls Class I tests affirmatively the strongest because he
believes that to be (non-relatively) external is to be physical and, as
he sees it, the decisive mark of physicality is lawful interaction with
other physical things. "Physicality", he says in Minute Logic
,
"consists
in being under the governance of physical causes" (1.253). Further, as
he makes clear in 8.1UU, the point about cameras and seismometers is
that they record interactions occurring when no observer is present.
Since the non-relative externality is independent of the thoughts of any
particular persons
,
if it can be established that a given phenomenon
takes place when no observer is present, that would be strong evidence
for the phenomenon's thought-independence. Class I tests are negatively
the weakest because our ability to detect interactions between externals
is limited and our judgments about the external world fallible. The
failure to detect a given phenomenon or to fit it into our scientific
picture of the external world may result from limitations of knowledge
or technology. Hence, such failures do not provide conclusive evidence
of internality.
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Class II tests presuppose that the external is publically ac-
cessible and persists over tine. Internal phenomena are private and
more labile. Class II tests are only of middling value for several
reasons. First, although a particular internal phenomenon is directly
witnessed by only one person, different people may experience internal
phenomena of the same sort. Thus, when Peirce discusses hallucinations
in the "Lectures on Pragmatism," he notes that Class II tests are not
always sufficient to establish internality and Class I tests may be
required in addition.
Hallucinations proper - obsessional hallucinations -
will not down at one’s bidding, and people who are
subject to them are accustomed to sound the people
who are with them in order to ascertain whether the
object before them has a being independent of their
disease or not. There are also social hallucinations.
In such cases a photographic camera or other instru-
ment might be of service. (5=117)
Furthermore, an external phenomenon may happen to be detected, or to be
detectable, by only one observer. Perhaps only one person present has
eyes keen enough to see a very distant or a very minute object. Like-
wise, some physical objects, such as certain particles created in
nuclear reactors, do not persist long enough for a single observer to
2
make repeated observations of the same object. For these reasons,
neither the testimony of other persons, nor one's own repeated obser-
vation, provide conclusive evidence of internality or externality.
The presuppositions of Class III tests are more difficult to char-
acterize. Peirce says that Class III tests include, "Criticism of all
the circumstances of the apparition, ending with the readiest and, in
2This is, of course, my example rather than Peirce's.
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case its evidence should be negative, the most conclusive of all single
tests, namely that of making a direct inward effort to suppress the
apparition”. The final test mentioned, that of attempting to will the
phenomenon away, seems oO suppose that whatever can be dismissed merely
by an act of will is internal. Peirce calus such tests "the most con-
clusive of all single tests" for internality because nothing would
better demonstrate the thought-dependence of a phenomenon than the sub-
ject s ability to suppress that phenomenon merely by a thought, i.e.
,
an
act 01 direct inward effort or will. He fails to notice a problem here,
however. It seems that sometimes certain external phenomena can be
suppressed merely by a thought. The movements of the subject provide
one example of such external phenomena. (Perhaps bodily movements are
the only example.) Some hold that the subject suppresses movements of
his body on certain occasions simply by willing that they should cease.
In any case, I shall leave this as a problem for later discussion.
Considerations similar to those raised above play a large part in
Peirce’s discussion of internality. In the course of a discussion of
"Pragnatism" in Baldwin’s Dictionary he wrote:
Every man inhabits two worlds . ... The greatest
difference between them, by far, is that one of
these two worlds, the Inner World, exerts a com-
paratively slight compulsion upon us, though we
can by direct effort so slight as to be hardly
noticeable change it greatly . . . ; while the
other world, the Outer World, is full of irresis-
table compulsions for us, and we cannot modify it
in the least except by one particular kind of effort,
muscular effort, and but very slightly even in that
way
. ( 5 • ^7^
)
Indeed, he sometimes seems to regard Class III tests, not merely as one
sort of test for internality
,
"but as forming the criterion of inter-
nality
.
Vie are accustomed to speak of an external uni-
verse and an inner world of thought. It comes
to this; there are some ideas . . . which will
have their own way, and we cannot swerve them
much, and the little effect we can produce upon
them we produce only indirectly. They make up
or indicate the outer world. There are other
ideas which are docile, -they are just what we
think they ought to be . They form the inner
world. (7-^38, Grand Logic
,
1893)
In general, however, Peirce admits that there are various sorts of
internal phenomena not under the subject's voluntary control; as he in-
dicates in the discussion of hallucination quoted from 5*117* For this
reason, although Peirce seems to regard a phenomenon's being under
voluntary control as conclusive evidence for its internality, its
failure to down at the subject's bidding does not suffice to warrant a
judgment of externality. Hence, Class III tests are "affirmatively" the
weakest of the three.
One must not be misled by Peirce's ranking of the evidential
strength, affirmative or negative, of the three classes of tests. He
considers Class I and Class II negatively weaker than Class III; Class I
being weaker than Class II. However , as the discussion of hallucination
shows, Peirce believes that testimony and oests by physical concomitants
do justify judgments of internality. Since hallucinations propel will
not down at the subject's bidding, the evidence of Class III tests con-
cerning them is affirmative, i.e., evidence for externality. For this
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reason, one subject resorts to the testimony of his companions in order
to ascertain whether such phenomena are internal
. Even this test may
fail to provide ’negative' evidence and Peirce's comments on "social
hallucinations" suggest that Class I tests, negatively the weakest of
the three, can justify one in believing that a phenomenon is internal,
despite affirmative evidence provided by the other tests.
Further, though the test of making a direct inward effort to
suppress an apparition is, when its evidence is negative, the most
decisive of all single tests, there is reason to doubt that it provides
absolutely conclusive grounds for regarding a phenomenon as internal. I
have already pointed out a difficulty with Class III tests. Such tests
presuppose that whatever is under the control of the subject's direct
inward efforts belongs to the inner world. It seems, however, that the
subject's bodily movements - presumably external phenomena. - are so
controlled, at least on occasion. Peirce might reject this latter
claim, but in any case he should have something to say for himself here.
Before considering what Peirce might say about the point raised
above, it is worth noting that things pertaining to the subject's body
present some special difficulties. The problem of location has two
aspects, which Peirce does not clearly distinguish. It concerns first
attribution to the self; identifying a particular thing as one's own.
Second, it involves ascribing phenomena to one's inner world. One's
bodily movements are non-transferably one's own and may be described as
activities of the self but they do not belong to one's inner world.
1 Go
The epistemological issues raised by the question of how one knows that
they are activities of oneself resemble in many respects those raised by
asking the same sort of question about one's thoughts. In particular,
one's control over one's body provides evidence for the claim that it
is one's own. That one has such control over a phenomenon does not in
itself constitute conclusive evidence that the phenomenon in question
belongs to one's internal world.
How, then, is one to decide whether the movements of one's body
belong to the internal or the external world? Peirce might claim that
Class III tests cause no problem here, because one's bodily movements
are not really under the control of direct inward effort . Although he
does not say how one determines whether one can control something by
direct inward effort, he might take the following experiment as a rele-
vant test: Suppose that the subject takes curare or some other para-
lytic agent which allows him to retain consciousness. Any phenomena
which he can control under such circumstances are under the control of
his direct inward effort. That is to say, only what the subject can
control under any conditions in which he can think at all is under the
control of his direct inward efforts. Only this sort of control, Peirce
might maintain, counts as evidence of internality.
The experiment envisioned above is fairly exotic and one might
question whether what happens under such extreme conditions should serve
as the standard for determining the limits of the subject’s voluntary
control. It would seem more plausible to resort to testimony and the
evidence of physical concomitants to locate bodily movements. Since
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the movements of one's tody are open to public inspection arid register
on various sorts of recording devices, one has strong evidence for their
externality. That one should have recourse to Class I and II tests in
establishing the location of one's bodily movements indicates that Class
III tests do not provide conclusive evidence for internality, since, on
the evidence of Class III tests, they are internal. Nor is it clear
from Peirce's remark that Class III tests represent "the most conclusive
of all single tests" for internality that he regards them as absolutely
conclusive. In any case, I shall later argue that the evaluation of
evidence provided by Class III tests depends upon the evidence of tests
in the ether two classes.
Intuition and the problem of location
According to the discussion of epistemic immediacy in Chapter III,
Peirce needs to do two things in order to establish that we do not have
immediate knowledge of the internal as internal: first, he needs to
show that there is evidence relevant to the justification of judgments
ascribing various phenomena to one's inner world and, second, he must
show that one is not justified in believing that a phenomenon belongs to
one's inner world unless one is also warranted in accepting such evi-
dence. How do his views concerning the nature of the internal and the
three classes of tests for internality fit into this project?
One may represent Peirce's argument against immediate knowledge of
the internal as internal as follows: He begins by explaining what it is
for something to belong to the subject's inner world: a thing belongs
108
to that world if it is dependent upon the subject's thoughts. He then
considers what would count as evidence that something depends upon the
subject's thoughts. He proposes three marks of thought-dependence:
lack of physical concomitants, privacy, and subjugation to direct inward
effort. The three classes of tests set out in "Some Amazing Mazes"
serve to assess whether a given phenomenon has any of the character-
istics mentioned. Thus, his discussion of the test has a dual purpose.
It points out three sorts of statements which, if true, count as evi-
dence for the truth of the subject's belief that a given phenomenon
belongs to his internal world: That is, statements asserting that the
phenomenon in question lacks physical concomitants, that the subject has
privileged access to the phenomenon, or that the subject can suppress it
by direct inward effort. Further, his discussion suggests three sorts
of tests or evidence which make such statements rationally acceptable:
respectively, the evidence provided by measuring instruments of various
sorts, the testimony of other observers, and the exercise of direct
inward effort against the phenomenon in question. If the above pro-
posals are correct, Peirce has accomplished the first half of his task.
Are these proposals correct? They are at least plausible. Peirce’s
account of internality as thought-dependence seems reasonable enough.
It does not differ in any important way from Descartes' own account
according to which things internal are modifications of conscious sub-
stance and, hence, dependent upon consciousness. Further, that some
phenomenon is under the control of the subject's will, private, or lacks
physical concomitants does constitute evidence that the phenomenon in
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question is dependent upon the subject's thoughts. Peirce does not say
that these three considerations provide the only evidence for inter-
nality. He maintains only that, if a phenomenon exhibits one or more of
these characteristics
,
the subject has some reason to believe that it
belong to his internal world. Finally, the three sorts of tests pro-
posed do provide evidence that a thing possesses the appropriate char-
acteristics .
What of the second half of Peirce’s task? Is the sort of evidence
provided by the three tests indispensible for the justification of
judgments ascribing phenomena to the subject's inner world? The Cartesian
can admit that the considerations Peirce mentions do provide evidence
for internality. He denies, however, that the subject need be warranted
in accenting such evidence in order to know that a thing belongs to the
inner world. If successful, this reply blocks the second half of Peirce's
argument against immediate knowledge of the internal as internal. To
decide whether the Cartesian's response succeeds, one must ask whether,
supposing that one is not warranted in believing that a given phenomenon
is under his voluntary control, or private, or lacks physical concomi-
tants, it is plausible to contend that one is justified in taking that
phenomenon to be a feature of one's inner world? As I previously
admitted, I know of no rigorous procedure for settling such questions.
Nevertheless, I offer the following remarks in support of Peirce's
answer
.
Let us suppose that a subject S encounters a phenomenon 0 and that
S has no justification for believing either that he can suppress 0 b>
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direct in-ward effort, or that he enjoys privileged access to 0, or that
0 lacks physical concomitants. This last supposition requires further
explanation.
.-/hat Peirce calls "tests by physical concomitants" allow
one to ascertain whether a given phenomenon manifests itself when no
numan observers are present. In his review of Pearson he describes the
sorts of evidence taken into account in deciding whether a particular
object
,
an inkstand, is an external things.
. . . I may call this into question. But as soon
as I do that
,
I find that the inkstand appears there
in spite of me. If I turn away my eyes, other wit-
nesses will tell me that it still remains. If we
all leave the room and dismiss the matter from our
thought
,
still a photographic camera would show the
inkstand still there, with the same roundness polish
and transparency, and with the same opaque liquid
within . Thus, ... I confirm myself in the opinion
that its characters are what they are, and persist
at every opportunity in revealing themselves
,
regard-
less of what you, or I, or any man, or any generation
of men may think. (8.lU4) (my emphasis.)
When one applies a Class I test to 0, one tests to see whether 0 persists
in the absence of S. What one grants when one allows that S is not
warranted in believing that 0 lacks "physical concomitants" is that S is
not warranted supposing that he must be present in order for 0 to occur.
Wow if S is not justified in taking 0 to be under his control, nor in
believing that 0 is private to him, nor even in believing that his
presence is required for 0's existence, then it seems to me implausible
to maintain that, nevertheless, S warrantedly regards 0 as a feature of
his internal world, something dependent upon his thoughts.
I should emphasize that I am not here claiming that S must believe
Ill
that 0 has any of the marks of thought-dependence mentioned above. I
contend only that his warrant for believing that 0 belongs to his interna]
world is conditional on whether he is warranted in ascribing some of
those marks to 0. This condition can hold whether or not S actually
believes that 0 has the features in question.
One might object to my defense of Peirce on the grounds that it
presupposes that S accepts Peirce's conception of relative internality.
Suppose, a critic might argue, that S employs a different conception of
internality, one according to which none claims investigated in Class I -
Class III tests constitute evidence for relative internality. In that
case, the evidence discussed above would be irrelevant to the justifi-
cation of S's belief that 0 belongs to his internal world.
The above objection tells against Peirce only on the supposition
that it is reasonable to attribute to S the belief that 0 belongs to his
inner world. By way of an example, consider a person who says that a
particular thing is a lump of gold, but regards it as irrelevant to the
justification of his claim whether the thing in question is a metal, is
malleable, has a certain color, a certain atomic weight, etc. There is
some point, I think, at which one should cease to attribute to such a
person a belief correctly expressible in the ordinary location, 'This is
gold'. Similarly, Peirce can argue that a subject whose conception oi
internality is such that evidence concerning a phenomenon's dependence
on the subject's thoughts is irrelevant to the justification of the
belief that the phenomenon in question belongs to his inner world.
112
cannot "be properly said, to have that oerief
. Peirce’s account of the
evidence for internality does depend upon his conception of the inter-
nal. But it matters whether that conception captures the ordinary
notion of internality, or at least, an essential part of that notion.
Before closing the discussion of immediate knowledge of the internal
as internal, I should mention two further problems. First, a Cartesian
might grant that, to know that something is internal, the subject must
be justified in believing that it. is under the control of his direct
inward efforts, or that it is private, and so forth, but maintain that
this merely shows that direct experience of a phenomenon suffices to
justify the claim that it has those features. That is, he might argue
that the subject knows immediately whether a phenomenon is under his
control, private, or lacks physical concomitants. Given Peirce’s notion
of internality, this claim may be regarded as simply a more precise
version of the thesis that the subject knows immediately whether a
phenomenon belongs to his inner world. But, there is an important
difference between the two claims. If we simply ask ourselves whether
the latter is true, without considering what is involved in regarding
something as internal, it is very difficult to form any estimate of the
claim’s plausibility. But, when we consider the former, it seems to me
apparent that it is not at all plausible to suppose that merely by
experiencing a phenomenon the subject can tell whether he can suppress
it by inward effort, whether he has privileged access to it, or whether
it will persist in his absence. By developing the consequences oi the
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Cartesian position on immediate knowledge of the internal as internal,
Peirce exposes implausibilities which are not obvious on first inspec-
tion.
Second, one might object that Peirce's three tests for internality
presuppose some knowledge of the internal as internal and, hence, cannot
account for the justification of all our claims to such knowledge. In
particular, one can obtain evidence from Class III tests only if one can
reliably determine whether one has exerted a direct inward effort. In
order to justify the belief that a given phenomenon is internal by means
of a Class III test, therefore, one must already be able to recognize
whether certain sorts of activities, direct efforts, belong to one's
internal world.
Peirce could reply to this objection in a number of ways. Its most
important short-coming, however, is that it misunderstands his argument.
That argument does not aim to establish any sort of precedence among the
things we know. It does not contend that the subject must first deter-
mine that he can suppress a phenomenon by direct inward effort and then
infer from this that the phenomenon belongs to his internal world.
Rather, the argument is that statements ascribing phenomena to the sub-
ject's inner world are linked with other sorts of statements in such a
way that the subject is not justified in accepting certain of the latter.
Exactly what this kind of linkage implies about the temporal precedence
of some sorts of knowledge over other sorts, or about derivation, can be
ascertained only within a general theory of knowledge. In Question
llU
Four 3 Peirce aims to establish that inner knowledge derives from a pre-
vious knowledge of the external world. The argument presently under
consideration makes no such assumption concerning the relation between
knowledge of the internal as internal and the evidence provided by the
three classes of tests.
Thus, I think Peirce has good reason to suppose that there is evi-
dence relevant to the subject's judgments of internality and that the
subject requires such evidence in order to be warranted in believing
that a thing belongs to his internal world. This entitles Peirce to
reject the Cartesian doctrine that we have intuitive or immediate know-
ledge of the internal as internal.
Knowledge of the internal as internal and external judgments
The foregoing section concerns Peirce's argument tha.t knowledge of
the internal as internal is inferential. He wants to establish a
stronger conclusion: That the inferences required for knowing that
something belongs to the inner world involve judgments about the external
world. In line with the interpretation of Peirce's claims about infer-
entiality in the preceding section, I suggested that his stronger
thesis be understood as follows : For any statement asserting that some
phenomenon belongs to the subject’s inner world such that the subject
knows that p is true, there is a body of statement e^ . . • ,
e
n ,
each
distinct from p, such that (i) the truth of e. en
constitutes
evidence for the truth of p, (ii) the subject is not justified in believing
that p is true unless he is justified in accepting e ^ , . . .,
e
^,
and
(iii) at least one of e ± - en is
a statement about the external world.
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If the argument of the preceding section is correct, Peirce has
established (i) and (ii) above. Further, it seems that he has estab-
lished (i) and (ii) in a way which shows that the third condition is
satisfied as well. After all, to know that one has carried out a
Class I or Class II test, one must know that, for example, certain
instruments have given such and such reading, or that some other person
has offered testimony. These are what Peirce calls "external facts",
and it would appear that
,
since Class I and II tests figure in the
justification of beliefs concerning the internal as internal, some of
the statements one uses as evidence for such beliefs will be external
statements
.
Peirce has not established, however, that all three sorts of tests
are indispensible for knowledge of the internal as internal. This is
important for the current discussion because one class of tests. Class III,
seems not to require any judgments about the external world. To perform
a Class III test one simply makes a direct inward effort to suppress a
phenomenon. If the phenomenon goes away, one has, according to Peirce,
excellent evidence that it was an internal phenomenon. Should this sort
of evidence be sufficient to warrant a verdict of internality , one would
have knowledge of the internal as internal. No judgments about the
external world seem to have played any part in one's attainment of this
knowledge. Thus, one might conclude, condition (iii) fails to hold for
some instances of knowledge of the internal as internal.
In order to block the argument sketched above, Peirce needs m show
that one cannot be justified in believing that one has suppressed a
phenomenon by direct inward effort unless one is justified in accepting
Il6
certain sorts of statements about the external things. The preceding
paragraph suggests that one can tell whether one has suppressed a
phenomenon simply by seeing whether it goes away after an inward exer-
tion. But, what is it for a phenomenon to 'go away'? If this means
only that the subject is no longer conscious of the phenomenon, then the
subject can suppress a phenomenon simply by shifting his attention
elsewhere. In that case, many unproblematically external phenomena are
suppressible by inward effort. Rather, to suppress a phenomenon must be
to terminate its existence. The subject is not justified in concluding
that a phenomenon has ceased to exist simply by the fact that he is no
longer conscious of it. External phenomena persist whether or not he is
conscious of them.
How can the subject tell whether he has suppressed a phenomenon?
In line with Peirce's discussion of the three sorts of tests, it is
natural to suggest that, in addition to simply looking for himself, he
might rely on the testimony of other observers or on tests by physical
concomitants. Indeed, unless he is warranted in believing that the
phenomenon in question lacks physical concomitants at a time t, i.e. is
not interacting with physical phenomena at t, and is not observed to
exist at t by other persons 3 , he is not justified in supposing that he
has suppressed the phenomenon at t. Both the belief that a phenomenon
lacks physical concomitants and the belief that other persons do not
3By this I do not mean that the observation takes place at t,
but that it is observed that the phenomenon exists at t.
observe a phenomenon are beliefs about things external to the subject
(though, in the later case, the belief may not concern anything which is
non-relatively external): That is to say, the statements expressing
what the subject believes in each case are external statements. Further,
it would seem that, with respect to any particular phenomenon, whether
the subject is justified in having such beliefs depends upon whether he
is justified in accepting specific external-statements, e.g., 'So and so
denied having witnessed the phenomenon 1
,
'The camera was in place and
functioning properly, but the photographs reveal no sign of the phenom-
enon'
,
and so forth. Thus, in order to be justified in believing, on
the basis of a Class III test, that something is internal, one must also
be justified in accepting certain external-statements.
Other sorts of considerations also reveal the dependence of Clans
III tests on beliefs about external things. Class III tests provide
evidence of internality only on the assumption that the subject cannot
suppress external phenomena by direct inward effort. Otherwise, one s
success in eliminating a phenomenon by inward effort would provide no
reason for denying that the phenomenon was external. Hence, the evi-
dential value of Class III depends to some extent on the acceptability
of an assumption concerning the nature of external things.
Thus, Peirce's argument against the claim that we have immediate
knowledge of the internal as internal, provides him with an argument for
his view that such knowledge 'derives from external facts' as well.
CONCLUSION
Hov does Peirce's critique of introspection stand in light of the
three arguments discussed? In Question Four he undertakes a radical
criticism of the Cartesian tradition regarding our knowledge of the
inner world. The Cartesian holds that we have intuitive knowledge of
things internal and that such knowledge provides the foundation from
which we derive what we know concerning the external world. The argu-
ment of Question Four strikes at both positions, contending not merely
that inner knowledge is inferential, hut that it derives by inference
from external facts. Unfortunately, that argument fails to establish
its ambitious conclusions. The Externalization Thesis will not support
the epistemological weight Peirce requires it to bear.
Peirce's later arguments do something to retrieve his critique of
introspection. The argument in "Consequences" shows that we do not have
intuitive knowledge of certain modes of thought and suggests a strategy
for showing that none of the modes of thought are known immediately. To
carry out this strategy he must establish for each mode, as he does for
anger and cognition, that our ability to distinguish instances of that
mode depends upon our knowledge of the context of thought in which it
occurs. This requires a careful, case by case discussion of the various
modes of thought. The success of this strategy in dealing with such
disparate modes as cognition and anger indicates that it may be broadly
applicable
.
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The final argument supports a limited version of Peirce’s claim
that inner knowledge derives from external facts. It shows that, in so
far as our beliefs about our internal phenomena involve the belief that
these phenomena are psychical, or belong to someone’s inner world, these
beliefs cannot be justified for us unless we are also justified in
making certain suppositions about external things. This does not
establish that all knowledge of the internal as internal derives from a
temporally prior knowledge of the external world. It does, however,
uncover an intimate interdependence between the knowledge that something
belongs to the inner world and beliefs about the external one.
The conclusions to which his later arguments entitle him are weaker
than the conclusions Peirce infers from the argument of Question Four.
In order to vindicate his claim that all our knowledge of the inner
world derives from external facts, he needs to do a good deal more. He
must find some way to deal with knowledge of qualities of feeling, for
example. But, whether or not he can salvage the radical thesis pro-
pounded in Question Four, Peirce's later arguments constitute a signifi-
cant criticism of the Cartesian tradition on introspective knowledge.
His critique of introspection is a qualified success as it stands.
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